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QUANTIFICATION OF THE 
DEFAULT PROBABILITY OF THE TOP 42 
NON-FINANCIAL SOUTH AFRICAN FIRMS 
by 
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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this dissertation is to quantify the probability of firm default focusing on 
the top 42 non-financ ial firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This paper 
follows the same methodology as outlined in the Moody's KMV white papers in 
implementing the Merton (1974) model. The model of default prediction builds upon 
option theory as pioneered by Black and Scholes and derives the probability of default 
predominately from the price and volatility of equity. In addition, BEE (Black 
Economic Empowerment) transactions currently being experienced within the South 
African corporate sector are further incorporated into the model. The results of this 
dissertation show that the Merton (1974) model may be used as a source of information 
ofthe underlying credit risk of publicly traded firms in South Africa. 
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Introduction 
All types of firms around the world are exposed to many different types of risks. 
These risks can be generally categorized as market, operational, liquidity, systemic and 
finally their associated credit risks. For banks and other lending institutions credit risk 
has always been the most subjective risk to measure since the first credit had been 
extended. 
Credit risk can be defined as the risk of loss experienced due to the counterparty's 
failure to meet its obligations on a financial/non-financial contract or derivative 
transactions. Due to the wide range of counterparties (from individuals to firms and 
sovereign governments) and the many types of obligations (from consumer loans, 
bank loans, bonds to derivative transactions) credit risk can take on many different 
forms. 
The first element of credit risk is the probability that such an event will occur; this 
event can be seen as the probability of default. In general, financial obligations require 
the service of interest and capital, and failure to service these obligations would 
constitute default. 
In assessing credit risk with respect to firms, the focus of traditional credit analysis has 
been on fundamental accounting information, a general evaluation of the industrial 
environment, investment plans and balance sheet data. Management skills serve as a 
primary input for the assessment of the fum's likelihood of survival. This generally 
takes the form of whether the fum has the ability to generate sufficient cash flow to 
service its debt obligations over a certain time horizon, or over the life of the 
outstanding liabiliti s. 
It is a well-known critique of this approach, that financial statement analysis may 
present a flawed picture of a fum's true financial condition and future prospects. 
Accounting principles are predominandy backward oriented and conservative in 
design. Moreover, accounting information does not include a precise concept of the 
future uncertainty and 'creative accounting' might even intend to disguise the fum's 
factual situation within certain legal limits. However, the adoption and implementation 
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of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) attempts to create a more 
transparent analysis regarding a fum's financial statements and thus the fum's financial 
circumstances. 
However, prior to default, there is no sure way of identifying whether a fum would 
indeed default. Therefore, the purpose of traditional agency credit risk ratings is to 
categorize firms into various classes, each of which is homogenous in terms of its 
probability of default. These ratings thus provide an indication of the credit risk of the 
specific fum or obligor, but currendy provide no quantification of the default 
probability within markets such as South Africa. 
Historically default estimation is predominately tagged to the large corporate US listed 
debt market, and secondly the US market has in the past experienced actual defaults. 
These historical default rates provide a relatively robust, but aged dataset across many 
forms of firms and obligors thus enabling rating agencies in the US to assign a generic 
default probability per rating category. 
The South African market presents a rather uruque case with respect to default 
estimation. South African firms opt to obtain finance from banks and equity markets 
opposed to debt markets. The reason behind this is that the local corporate debt 
market is not only relatively new, but rather illiquid. Currendy no fum has defaulted on 
their listed debt. Gi en this proposition, the effective probability of fum default is thus 
zero, however, this cannot be the case. 
There currendy exist a large number of methods used to assess the likelihood of fum 
default: the first formalized methods have been the scoring methods building on 
accounting and balance sheet data as pioneered by Altman and Ohlson in calculation 
of their Z and 0 scores respectively. Other, more recent methods, such as credit rating 
methods based on Value-at-Risk (V AR) such as 'CreditMetrics' or models built on 
macroeconomic variables such as 'CreditPortfolio View' have recendy evolved. 
The most popular and widespread method currendy used today builds on the original 
Merton (197 4) model. This model determines the default probability of an individual 
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firm mainly &om the market price and volatility of the firm's equity building on well- / 
known option pricing theory as pioneered by Black and Scholes. The central idea of 
the Merton (1974) model to view the firm's equity as a call option on the firm's assets 
calculating an implied default probability from the value and volatility of the firm 
(inferred &om the value and volatility of equity) in relation to a predetermined default 
barrier such as the face value of a zero-coupon bond or more practically the firm's 
total liabilities. This method of default estimation has become revolutionary within 
credit risk literature and is currendy promoted by Moody's KMV 1 as a financial risk 
management product. 
As the market for credit is currendy expanding worldwide we can distinguish among 
certain key measures that are critical to the management of credit risk, however, none 
of these measures can be achieved without the most primary input - the default 
probability of the individual firm, making the probability the most important and 
subjective element to determine. 
One factor to consider with firm default is the amount of money lost when such default 
occurs; this is generally referred to as the loss ·ven default. This measure incorporates 
the fact that firm default can occur both with the first as well with the last repayment of 
the firm's obligations. Furthermore, as loss given default provides a measure of the 
monetary value lost due to default, migratory risk further incorporates the changes 
within the default probability and the associated value impact changes, and thus 
advances this measure to which is more commonly known as Value-at-Risk (VAR). A 
final element of effective credit risk management would be to incorporate default 
correlations, as these correlations consider the degree to which the default risks of 
individual borrowers or firms are related to each other. 
It is important to bear in mind that credit risk of individual firms must be quantified and 
managed as a risk. The current trend is for all banks to contribute to an international 
body of knowledge to create a foundation for global banking best practice and to create 
t Stephen Kealhofer, John McQuown and Oldrich Vasicek founded KMV in 1989. In 2002, KMV was acguired by 
Moody's and was renamed Moody's KMV. 
Page 8 
a transparent methodology by which credit risks are effectively assessed and managed. 
The goal of all banks is to comply with the Capital Accord instituted by the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland 2• 
The first Capital Accord as suggested by the BIS was first published in 1988 referred 
to as Basel I. Following on Basel I, the BIS released a new capital accord tilted Basel II 
which is scheduled to be adopted on 1 January 2008 3. The major difference between 
the two is that by q antifying the inherent risk of all firms and obligors from a credit 
risk point of view, banks would be able to change the amount of capital that is kept for 
reserve purposes and thus use this excess capital more productive means. 
It should be noted that to comply with the BIS is not legally binding, and that 
complying with the Capital Accord has been suggested as 'global best banking 
practice'. However, in order to comply with the BIS, banks are required to manage 
their credit risk at both transaction level and portfolio level. One of the first steps that 
banks would need to take to adhere to the Basel II Capital Accord, is to implement 
one of the many model's for credit risk estimation, such as the implementation of the 
Merton (197 4) model as discussed in this paper. The active calculation of default 
probabilities would enable banks to asses the underlying credit risk of each firm or 
obligor within their credit portfolios and adjust their capital reserves accordingly. 
South African financial intuitions are currendy implementing propriety credit risk 
models in order to comply with the Basel II Capital Accord. This research paper 
introduces the first formalised method of quantifying the probability of default by 
implementing the Merton (197 4) model. The goal of this dissertation is to present a 
numerical analysis of the probability of default for the top 42 actively traded non-
financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
The paper is structured as follows: The original Merton (197 4) model assumptions and 
key inputs are presented. The paper then shows step for step how Merton adjusts the 
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) http: / / www.bis.org 
3 BIS (1996) -Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks 
/1::. 7/ 
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Black and Scholes option pricing formula for a European call option to provide a 
measure of the default probability of an individual firm. The Merton (197 4) model is 
further adjusted to incorporate asset-leakages, and a discussion is presented on how 
risk-neutral probabilities are transformed into 'real-world' probabilities by the inclusion 
of the asset-drift of the individual firm into the model. Furthermore, a brief history 
regarding Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) within South Africa is presented and 
shows how BEE will affect the model of default prediction. The methodology and 
assumptions made regarding the measurement and estimation procedures adopted for 
all the input variables used in the model is further presented. 
The input variables are further separated in the model into a base-case and worst-case 
variable respectively. This scenario analysis enables the study to calculate the 
probability of firm default under current as well as severe market conditions and 
show's how the probabilities of default change with respect to changes in the input 
variables. Finally, a brief discussion of the Merton (197 4) model is presented followed 
by a discussion on extensions of the Merton (1974) model by Moody's KMV. 
The results section is outlined as follows: a brief discussion of the overall results is 
presented. The firms are subsequendy ranked in terms of probability of default 
providing both the base-case as well as worst-case probability. Certain data outliers are 
discussed in detail with respect to the overall firm ranking. A further analysis is 
presented whereby the paper attempts to establish a relationship between the 
calculated default probabilities and firms that are currendy rated by Moody's, Fitch and 
Standard and Poor. In Appendix B of this paper an in-depth analysis of each firm and 
their variables is presented. 
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The Merton (1974) Model 
In his seminal article on credit risk management, Robert C. Merton proposed a 
method to price a public firms debt based on the equilibrium theory of option pricing 
by Black and Scholes. The original purpose of the Black-Scholes model was to value 
corporate liabilities based upon their contingency claim analysis, which has been 
recently extended to value and price nearly all forms of derivatives. It was Merton, 
who proposed in his 197 4 paper on valuation of corporate debt "On The Pricing Of 
Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure Of Interest Rates" the extension and possible 
application of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula into the arena of default 
probability calculation. The Merton model was the first structural model to be 
published as it uses the evolution of the firms' capital structure, such as asset and debt 
values, to determine the time and probability of default by combining the movements 
of the firm's overall value relative to some pre-defined threshold or barrier, called the 
default point. 
Merton noted that when a bank makes a loan, it is similar to writing a P':t option on 
the assets of the borrower's firm. In terms of standard option methodology, the payoff 
&om equity mimics the payoff from a call option in the sense that if the value of the 
firm's assets were more than the value of the firm's debt the 'option' of holding the 
firm would be exercised and the value of the equity would thus be the difference 
between the value of the firms assets and the value of the debt. Thus, the equity of the 
firm is a call option on the assets, where the exercise price and the maturity are given 
by the face value and maturity of the debt. If the above notion did not hold (at least 
theoretically), the firm would have a high probability to default, since the equity would 
be worthless in an op tion theoretic approach. 
Application of the put-call parity principle illustrates that debt can be viewed as a 
default risk-free loan less a put option sold to equity-holders by debt-holders. Put-call 
parity states that holding a call option with a specific exercise price is equivalent to 
owning the underlying asset, borrowing with a required repayment of the same value 
of the exercise price, and holding a put option with the same exercise price. 
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• 
Translation of this into a capital structure paradigm would mean that the equity 
holders own the assets, have borrowed the debt amount, and also own the put option, 
which enables them to sell the asset for the borrowed amount. Thus, debt-holders, 
along with the debt, have also sold a put option to the equity-holders in recognition of 
the possibility of default. 
In this paradigm, default may mean two things: exercise of the put option or non-
exercise of the call option by the equity holders. This analogy between option pricing 
and capital structure builds the foundation of the Merton (197 4) model. 
Assumptions of the Merton (1974) Model 
The model is a somewhat stylised structural asset-based model that requires a number of 
assumptions. Among other things, the model assumes that the underlying value of each 
finn follows a geometric Brownian motion and that each firm has issued one zero-
coupon bond. 
The model requires the value of the firm to be estimated, where the strike price of the 
call option is equal to the face value of debt (the zero-coupon bond). The model 
recognises that neither the underlying value of the firm nor its volatility is direcdy 
observable. However, under the model's assumptions both can be inferred from the 
value of equity, the volatility of equity and several other observable variables by solving 
two non-linear equations simultaneously. After inferring these values, the mod}-e 
specifies that the probability of default can be represented by the normal density 
function of a z-score depending on the firm's underlying value, the firm's volatility and 
the face value of the firm's debt. 
' 
Page 12 
')• "" • ~ ,.. ~'""'.. ,.,._ •• ,_ ~ ~.f ""''-~" "'- t ' . ~ "" ...,,_ ~ #~.oit&4t __ _..:r., .;;;.,.o-.c f. " _ ... -~ .. _,. ~ ~ ~· • -' .. ~ ~ • • """-"""',.;~-~-"'-' ... "'"""""'"d;:m.,-.,,..;dNt<~;. ..._-;r.,...._."" """·~""' ~~ • • •• _.__,~ ~ 
Assumptions: 
1. Markets are frictionless: There are no transaction costs, no taxes, no short-selling 
restrictions, no information asymmetries; assets are perfectly divisible and 
continuously traded; borrowing and lending rates are equal (i.e. absence of bid-
ask spreads). 
2. Market participants are price takers: There are sufficiently many investors with 
comparable wealth levels such that they can buy or sell as much of an asset as 
they want at the market price. 
3. Constant risk-free interest rates: There is a risk-less asset whose rate of return 
per unit of time is known and constant, i.e. the term structure of interest rates is 
flat. Thus, the price of a risk-less discount bond paying R x at maturity T is 
R1 (T) = exp( -rT) where r is the instantaneous risk-free interest rate. 
4. Modigliani-Miller environment: The value of the firm V,, is invariant to its 
capital structure; it is equal to the (market) value of equity E1 , plus the market 
value of a representative zero-coupon non-callable debt contract D1 , maturing 
at time T with face value D as: 
Together with assumption (1) above, this implies that the value of the firm and the 
value of its assets are identical. 
' 
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5. Ito dynamics of firm value: The value of the firm (i.e. the value of its assets). V,, 
follows a geometric Brownian motion process as follows: 
Where J1 , r presents the instantaneous expected rate of return on the firm value 
with (J~ representing the instantaneous variance of the return on the firm value 
per unit of time referred to as 'asset return volatility' or simply 'firm value 
volatility', and dZ1,1 = &1 Jdt is a standard Gauss-Wiener process. 
6. Shareholder wealth maximization: Management acts to maximize shareholder 
wealth. 
7. Perfect anti-dilution protection: There are neither cash flow payouts, nor issues 
of any new type of security during the life of the contract, nor bankruptcy costs. 
This implies that default can only occur at maturity if the firm cannot meet the 
repayment of the face value of the debt, D. 
8. Perfect bankruptcy protection: Firms cannot file for bankruptcy except when 
they are unable to make the required cash payments. In this case, the absolute 
priority rule cannot be violated: shareholders obtain a positive payoff only if the 
debt holders are perfecdy reimbursed. 
1 
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Given these assumptions, the value of the equity of the finn E at time T (i.e. maturity) 
is presented by the following: 
E, = max(O, V: -D) 
From the viewpoint of the payoff structure, the equity of the finn E is equivalent to a 
call option on the assets of the finn V . 
Inputs of the Merton (1974) 4 Model 
Merton defines the following variables: 
v Value of the finn's assets today 
VT Value of the finn's assets at time T 
E Market value of the finn's equity 
ET Value of the finn's equity at time T 
D Face value of debt due in one year 
CJ'v Volatility of Assets 
(]' £ Volatility of Equity 
r Instantaneous risk free rate 
If Vr < D (it is at least in theory) rational for the finn to default on the debt at time T 
as the value of equity would thus be zero. If Vr > D, the finn should make the debt 
repayments at time T and the value of equity would be the deference between Vr -D. 
4 Merton (197 4) 
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J 
Merton's model therefore shows that the value the firm's equity at time Tis represented 
by: 
E(V,D) =max (0, Vr- D) 
Tills shows that the equity is a call option on the value of the assets with a strike price 
equal to the face value of the firm's debt. The Black-Scholes 5 formulae for a European 
call option provides Merton with the value of equity as follows: 
Where, 
Probability of Default 6 
The probability of default at time T is the probability that the market value of the 
firm's assets V, will be less than the book value of the firm's outstanding debt D at 
time T . To put it formally, at time zero, the default probability (DP) is given by: 
DP = P(V, ~D) and in terms of natural logarithms, 
DP = P(lnV, ~ ln D) . 
Following on this rationale of default, the following paragraphs show how the original 
Black and'Scholes equations are adapted to the Merton model of default calculation. 
5 Black, Fischer and Scholes (1973) 
6 The mathematical derivations of this section are based on the works of Kulkarni et a!. (2005), Crouhy et a!. (2000), 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) 
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In order to comput the value of equity (i.e. the call option on the firm's total assets), 
it is assumed that the firm's value process follows a geometric Brownian motion as 
follows : 
d~ = fL~dt + CJ~dW 
or often written as: 
V represents the value of firm's assets with fL representing the asset drift (i.e. the 
expected continuously compounded return on V). CJ v represents the volatility of the 
firm value and dW is seen to be a standard Gauss-Wiener process. 
By applying the Ito's lemma 7 the following equation can be obtained: 
( 
aE aE 1 2 2 a
2 
E J aE dE,= -+r~-+-O"v ~ --2 dt+O"v~-dZ, at av 2 a v av 
After several steps, the following partial differential equation (below) for the value of 
equity emerges. This equation forms the key differential equation in the Black and 
Scholes option pricing formulae: 
-+rV-+-CJ V ---rE =0 ( 
aE aE 1 2 2 a
2 
E J 
at ' av 2 v ' a V 2 
Where t refers to time, r refers to the instantaneous risk-free interest rate and CJ~ 
refers to the volatility of the firm's assets. 
7 For a discussion on the use of Ito's lemma see Hull (2002) 
s Black, Fischer and Scholes (1973) 
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From the two equations above, the following relationship emerges: 
It can be shown that incremental changes in ln V follows a generalized Gauss-Wiener 
process with a drift equal to (.u- a; Janda diffusion coefficient equal to a,. TM 
equation follows from the use of an approximation (below) for the incremental change 
in lnV from ln~ at time (t = 0) to lnVr. 
Where, 
ln V,. - ln V, - N[ ( ,u - a { Jr, a iT] Or alternatively, 
Since the logarithm of Vr as displayed above is normally distributed, the value of the 
firm at maturity ~· can be seen to be lognormal. Crouhy et al. (2000) claim, this 
assumption to be quite robust and the data actually confirms quite well to this 
hypothesis. Following on their study, the distribution of asset returns can be seen to be 
stable over time, i.e. the volatility of asset returns will remain relatively constant due to 
notion that the sta dard deviation of ln Vr is a linear function of .Jf, and thus, the 
uncertainty about the future development of the firm's asset value grows with the 
time-to-maturity. 
From the properties of the lognormal distribution, the moments for the asset value of 
the firm can be derived. 
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The mean has the form: E(Vr ) = ~e"r 
And the variance: Var(Vr ) = ~2 e211r (ea~r -1) 
As the value of assets follow the geometric Brownian process, Crouhy et al. (2000) 
show that the value f firm's assets at time T, Vr can be represented by the following 
equation: 
and after arranging, 
Where .JT Zr = Wr - ~ is shown to be normally distributed with a zero mean and 
0 T 9 Wr - W 10 th d vanance equal to and Z r = .JT 1 can be shown to represent e ran om 
components of the firm's return. The probability of default at time T is the probability 
that the market value of firm's assets will be less than the book value of the firm's 
outstanding debt at time T o 
To describe this notion formally, at time zero, default probability (DP) is given by: 
DP = P(ln Vr ::::::; ln D), and after substituting the equation for ln Vr the default 
probability can be written as: 
9 Crouhy et alo (2000) 
to Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
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DP=Pr 
_ln__,(_~___:;J_+_(..:....,JL=--CY_;_;;_)_r ?. Zr 
CYv-fi 
As the random component of the firm's asset returns Z1 is seen to be lognormal, the 
default probability can be finally written as follows: 
DP=N 
In(~) + (p-¥ )r 
CYv -fi 
This key equation provides us with the probability of default for a firm at the time of 
maturity T (e.g. the default probability within in one year with T = 1 ). This equation 
shows that the probability of default is a function of the distance between the current 
value of the firm's assets and the face value of its liabilities adjusted for the expected 
growth in the firm's asset value relative to the firm's asset volatility 11 • 
This metric is known as the distance-to-default and thus, represents the number of 
standard deviations that the firm is away from default. The higher the distance-to-
default metric, the better for the firm as a higher distance-to-default value implies being 
further away from the default barrier which is represented by the face value of the 
zero-coupon bond or more realistically the face value of the firms total liabilities. It is 
at this stage that the unrealistic assumption of a single zero coupon-bond is at its 
weakest. Firms usually have a schedule of debt due at various times, however, 
according to the distance-to-default metric, firms might be in default but still currendy 
operating. 
11 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) 
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The default probability thus combines the distance-to-default metric transformed into 
the cumulative normal distribution, which can be seen to be equivalent to the 
martingale probability in the original Black and Scholes equation as shown below: 
Figure 1 below summanzes the above section and schematically displays the 
development of the value of the firm in relation to the distribution of the future firms 
asset value process. In addition the figure displays the distant-to-default metric, the 
default point and how this metric is transformed into the associated probability of 
default. The expected growth rate in the firm's assets is discussed in more detail in the 
section to follow. 
Figure 1: Distribution of the firm's asset value at maturity of the debt 
'o 
Market value 
of assets (V) 
Probability of Default 
Source: Moody's KMV and Crouhy et al. (2000) 
T 
Distribution of the 
asset value at time T 
• - . - • Default Point 
Time 
Page 21 
Adjusting the model to include Asset-Payouts 
One of the assumptions of the original Merton model is that there are no cash leakages 
from the firm. This assumption is highly unrealistic and the model has to be adjusted to 
include a form of leakage i.e. the asset pay out ratio of the firm. The previous equations 
are now modified to reflect this so called constant continuous asset-payout ratio. The 
value of equity today is thus represented by the following adjusted equation: 
12 
Where, d2 = d1 -av.JT -t 
The term 8 represe ts the continuous asset payout ratio expressed in terms of V . The 
term 8 appears twice in the equation above. The term Ve -or accounts for the reduction 
of the value of the assets due to the cash dividends being paid out before the maturity 
and the term (1- e -or ) V, which doesn't appear in original Merton equation was added 
by (Hillegeist et al, 2004) to account for the fact that dividends are accrued to equity 
holders. This term is missing in the regular call option valuation equation for dividend 
paying stocks becau e dividends do not accrue to option holders. Given the inclusion of 
the asset leakage, this changes the distant-to-default metric and the default probability 




I- - O'v.ff 
12 For the derivation of the equation for equity, see e.g. Chartkou et al. (2006) and Hillegeist et al (2004) 
13 Crouchy et al (2000) 
Page 22 
Calculation of the Risk Neutral Probability 
To calculate the distance-to-default as well as the risk-neutral probability of default 
N ( -d 2 ), estimates of V and a v are required, neither of these, which are direcdy 
observable. The estimation procedure makes use of two important equations. The first 
being the Black-Scholes-Merton equation that expresses the value of a firm's equity as a 
function of the value of the firm and the second, relating the volatility of the firm's value 
to the volatility of its equity. 
Since the firm is publicly traded, E can be observed, thus the equation below provides 
one condition that must be satisfied by V and a v . 
14 
(J' v can be estimated from Ito's lemma. This follows Merton's assumptions that the 
value of equity is a function of the value of the firm and time, and from Ito's lemma the 
following relationship emerges: 
15 
In the Black-Schole equation, it can be shown that oE = N(d1) 
16
• When combining av 
this proposition into the equation above, the volatilities of the firm and its equity are 
thus related by: 
This provides another equation that must be satisfied by V and a v . 
14 Chartkou et al. (2006) 
15 Merton (1974) 
16 Black, Fischer and Scholes (1973) 
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However, this equation again assumes currendy no asset payouts. Tbis equation can 
easily be modified to incorporate a constant asset payout ratio as seen below: 
17 
Given this link, these two key non-linear equations below can be solved simultaneously 
for estimates of V and 0' v . 
Kealhoffer (2003) demonstrates that these equations illustrate for stable firm volatility, 
equity volatility increases with declining stock prices and thus equity volatility will reach 
very high levels for a company at the brink of default. 
Hull (2002) suggests that the Newton Raphson 18 iterative algorithm can be used to solve 
the system of two non-linear equations in the form F(x + y) = 0 and G(x + y) = 0 to 
obtain the two unknown values of V and 0' v . In order to solve the equations, the solver 
routine function in Excel is used to minimize [F(x + y)] 2 + [G(x + y)] 2 = 0 with 
respect to V , 0' v and subject to the constraints V > 0, 0' v > 0 . 
After solving, the market value of the firm's assets as well as the volatility of the firm's 
assets are obtained. T is set to 1 in the model, as the model is used to calculate a yearly 
default probability, or alternatively the probability of default within one year. 
17 Suo and Wang (2006) 
18 Alternative procedures are discussed under the Assumption Section 
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Once this numerical solution is obtained, the distance-to-default metric can be calculated 
as follows: 
The risk-neutral distance-to-default metric is thus the difference between the estimated 
market value of the assets and the total liabilities scaled by the standard deviation of the 
firm's asset's market value. 
According to the Black-Scholes-Merton formulation, the risk neutral probability of 
default at any time t is given by: 
PD=P(Vr ~D) 
And summarising from the previous section the probability of default is transformed 
into a standard normal z-variable as follows: 
PD = N[ z,,; _InV, I D +~-;-a~ 12)T] = N(-d, ) 
19 Crouchy et al (2000) 
zo Crouchy et al (2000) 
20 
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Risk-Neutral Probabilities vs. 'Real-World' Probabilities 
As the Merton (197 4) model assumes that the value of the firm's assets grow at the risk 
free rate, the resultant probability of default would represent a risk-neutral probability 
opposed to a 'real-world' probability. 
The difference between the 'real-world' probability and the risk-neutral probability stems 
from the systematic component of default risk 21• The difference is determined from the 
expected return that is required for the systematic risk of the underlying firm. If the 
underlying firm had no systematic risk the expected return would simply be equal to the 
risk free rate and thus the two probabilities would be identical. 
The risk-neutral probability can easily be converted into the 'real-world' probability and 
vice versa with the knowledge of the assets required return, mathematically this required 
return is referred to as the drift of the asset 22. It should be noted here that the expected 
growth rate of the firm's assets over a specific horizon is required and not the equity 
drift. 
The risk-neutral probability implies defaults are more likely to occur by assuming that 
the firm's assets will grow only at the risk free rate of interest in absence of allowing the 
firm's assets to grow at a rate equivalent to that of the market. Therefore, the risk-neutral 
probability overstates the default probability in a 'real-world' sense 23 . This notion holds 
generally, however, in certain specific firms this concept may not hold at all. However, It 
can be shown that the risk-neutral and risk adjusted distribution of a firm's asset value 
process have equivalent variances, and by incorporating the asset drift of the firm, shows 
that the risk-adjusted distribution of the asset value process would imply a mean greater 
than the risk free rate thus providing a 'real-world' probability of default. 
21 For related discussion of 'real-world' versus risk-neutral probabilities, see D emchak (2000) and Crouhy et all (2000) 
22 Kealhoffer (2003) 
23 Deliandes and Geske (2003) 
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Following from literature 2\ the use of a risk free rate of interest is highly unrealistic in 
the Merton (1974) model. The interest rate reflected in the model has to incorporate the 
markets perception of future financing rates. In implementation of the model, a one-
year forward financing is used and it is assumed that firms will service their debt 
obligations at this rate in the future. 
By integrating the asset drift and a forward financing rate enables the original Merton 
(1974) model to provide a more empirical measure of the default probability. The 
section to follow pr sents a methodology, which integrates the theoretical relationship 
between the expected return of the firm's assets and the expected return of equity. 
24 Kealhoffer et Al (1998) and Kealho ffer (2003) 
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Calculation of the Asset Drift 25 
The equation below relates equity to follow a stochastic differential process or 
alternatively an Ito's process. 
dE, = ;iE,dt + (Y EE,dZ, 
Where E, , represents the value of equity and a E represents the equity volatility. It is 
assumed that at any time i.e. instantaneously, the following definition relations hold: 
V, = E, + D, and 
dV, = dE, + dD, 
That is, the value of the firm's asset must be equal to the value of debt and equity and 
the change in the value of the assets must be equal to the change in the values of 
equity and debt. By using Ito's lemma, the process for equz!J can be presented as follows: 
(
aE aE 1 2 2 a2 E J aE dE,= -+ JlvV, -+-avV, --2 dt+avV, -dZ, at av 2 a v av 
By comparing the diffusion terms in the process for equity above the asset volatility and 
the equity volatility must satisfy the following equation as obtained from the previous 
section: 
Where N(d1) is referred to as the hedge ratio or the equity delta in standard option 
terminology and thus the 'option Greeks' are presented as follows and again adjusted 
for continuous asset leakages namely 8 . 
25 This section is based on Kulkarni et al (2005) and Crouchy et al (2000) 
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• Equity Delta: 
• Equity Gamma: 
• Equity Theta: 
Therefore it can be shown that: 
8N(d1) 
av 
1 xf I z2 0 N(x) = -- e-2 dz &_,., 
Where, N(x) denotes the probability distribution function of the standard normal 
variate. 
By substituting the option Greeks into the process for equity the following equations 26 
are obtained which can be used to solve for the drift of the firms assets f-Lv . 
26 Kulkarni et al (2005) 
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The equity drift J.lE 21 can be estimated from the stock market by making use of the 
CAPM model as follows: 
J.lE- r = f3n 
Where 1r represent the market price of risk and r is assumed to be the one-year 
forward financing rate. The beta of equity with respect to the market portfolio is 
calculated as follows: 
The market portfolio for the purpose of the calculation in South Africa can be 
represented by the JSE Top 40 Index or alternatively the ALSI (All Share) Index. It is 
assumed that the betas as calculated by Cadiz FSG 28 shall suffice for this purpose and 
are discussed under the section on model assumptions. Once f3 , 1r and r are 
obtained, the equity drift J.l E can be calculated as follows: 
The final step is to combine the equity drift along with the equity theta, delta and gamma 
in the equation below to obtain the asset drift J.l v . 
Jlv = 





27 Crouchy et al (2000) 
28 Cadiz Financial Services G roup http:/ / www.cadiz.co.za 
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Having found V and a-v by solving the system of non-linear equations from the 
previous section, the asset drift Jlv is now combined to calculate the real-world default 
probability by substituting the risk-free rate with a rate to be equivalent to the growth of 
the finn's assets and thus the probability of default can be re-written as follows: 
N(d
2
) = N[- ln V I D + (Jlv - 8- a-~ /2)T] 
a-v.ff 
29 
It is worth noting that the impact of the asset payout ratio and the forward financing 
rates are inherently included in the calculation of the risk-neutral probability of default 
from the previous section. The risk-neutral probability of default is further adjusted to 
incorporate the asset drift as presented in this section. The financing rate and asset 
payout rates are further considered in the calculation of the option Greeks as presented 
in this section. A further discussion of the combination of interest rates and asset 
payouts can be read under the section of assumptions to follow shortly. 
Prior to the implem ntation of the model and the assumptions regarding the inputs, it is 
necessary to give a brief history and discussion of Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) currently being experienced within the South African corporate sector, and the 
ultimate implication of BEE on the default model. 
29 Kulkarni et al (2005) and Crouchy et al (2000) 
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Black Economic Empowerment within South Africa 
A Brief History 
One of the most significant innovations in the Bill of Rights contained within South 
Africa's Constitution provides the general right to equality, allowing 'legislative' and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to advance the equality of all citizens 30• 
In recognizing the South African legacy of discrimination, the Bill of Rights clearly 
anticipated the government's pursuit of projects such as black economic empowerment 
(BEE). The government set a path of defining the key elements of BEE compliance. 
This compliance would need to be adhered to in respect of each and every sector of the 
South African economy. This approach of government was contained in a strategy 
document entided 'South Africa's Economic Empowerment' released by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in March 2003. However, by April 2004, this 
strategy had been supplemented with the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act of 2003 (the BE E Act), an enactment that finally moved the key elements of BEE 
compliance away from different sectoral initiatives and placed it firmly within the 
context of the law. 
Funding Black Economic Empowerment Transactions 
The challenge for outh Africa is to facilitate a sustainable transfer of econotruc 
ownership to the political majority without destroying that which drives a market 
orientated economy, shareholder capitalism, free enterprise and especially free financial 
markets. A simple principle of wealth creation is one must have capital to create capital 
and unfortunately severe limitations have been previously placed on the economic 
activities of black South Africans. The new wave of BEE tries to pave this arena with a 
daunting task of facilitating rapid capital accumulation to the political majority. Most 
sectors of the economy have set a target of 25 per cent black equity within the next five 
to ten years, while the financial services sector, with more than R2 trillion in assets/ 1 and 
30 Section 9(2) of the Cons tution of the Republic o f South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
31 Business Map (2004) 
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a combined market capitalisation of over RSOO billion, has set itself a target of 15 per 
cent black shareholding by 2014. 
Types of Funding 
Equity Finance 
This type of finance is where firms are willing to take on the buyer's equity to facilitate 
the purchase of a potion of the assets or the entire firm. Firms or individuals must have 
equity or capital that can be used to purchase the required assets. Although this is the 
general idea, equity finance can take on many forms. One can borrow the cash needed 
from investors who, in turn take up equity in the business, or, the seller is willing to take 
on some of the buy r's equity (essentially a stake in the liquid assets that the buyer has) 
in return for selling a portion or the entire firm. This example is one of the more 
common forms of financing mergers and acquisitions. However, very few black 
individuals or group are able to use this type of funding due the historical disadvantages 
placed on these designated groups in the past. These groups currendy have inadequate 
capital, assets and/ or collateral with which to lend with, and as thus, cannot use this 
form of finance. 
Third-Party Debt 
The second way of cquiring the asset is to borrow funds from a third-party financier, 
normally a bank. Us ally this form of finance requires that the investor has some form 
security or collateral that can be provided in forms such as shares, property or some 
other liquid asset. The bank or financier will provide the empowerment partner with 
finance at some form of interest generally at a spread over the floating interest rate, 
JIBAR (The Johannesburg Inter-Bank Agreed Rate). This spread will take the viability of 
the asset that the empowerment partner is buying (the inherent risk of the investment as 
well as the cost of capital of the firm being provided the finance). In this scenario, the 
empowerment partner will ensure that the loan provided would be serviced from profits 
generated from the investment. Good management practices would entail that the 
empowerment partners must allow for working capital costs as well as for reinvestment 
initiatives to ensure adequate firm growth. 
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Vendor/Leveraged Finance 
In general the owner of the assets provides finance to the buyer to acquire the same 
asset. Typically vendor financing in empowerment deals is through convertible 
instruments and equity derivatives. Most transactions entail providing share options to 
empowerment shareholders. It is becoming increasingly common to tie the deals to 
option schemes in which the partners gain immediate economic participation in the 
company, but have full ownership only when an option to buy shares matures and is 
exercised some years later. 
A general structure essentially grants the stake to the empowerment party, thus ensuring 
full economic and voting rights, but with an option for the firm to acquire the stake back 
after a specific period if the empowerment firm does not or cannot pay for it. The 
advantage of this structure is that the empowerment firm is able to reinvest its dividends 
by continuously converting the money into the group's equity increasing the potential 
size of the final net equity. 
There are concerns however of this type of structure, most notably section 38 of the 
South African Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 69 of 1984) which prohibits companies 
from providing financial assistance in the acquisition of their own shares, except for 
employee share-incentive schemes and for share-buy backs. However, the Companies 
Bill of 2007 intents to repeal the Companies Act, be it enacted by the Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa. This repeal states that Section 38 would not apply in instances 
relating specifically to BEE deals thus ultimately allowing companies to provide 
providing financial assistance in the acquisition of their own shares for BEE purposes. 
In addition to the above motioned structure and derivative instruments used; leveraged 
finance is becoming increasingly common in empowerment deals. The biggest 
advantage is that it makes it easier to raise capital, since the funders are loading debt on 
to the target company rather than the empowerment entity. This financing provides risk 
or assets against which to lend, and is becoming increasingly popular because companies 
faced with BEE pressure are willing to ease access to operating assets and thus cash 
flows of these BEE created entities. 
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Leveraged finance only works when firms are acquiring assets rather than shares. Most 
companies are reluctant to go through this route, since they want empowerment to be a 
once-off transaction. Ironically, the codes of good practice to measure BEE compliance 
have made leveraged finance deals more viable, because they recognize empowerment 
ownership through the sale of equity at a holding level, and at enterprise level, through 
the sale of business units. 
A big concern for most listed firms is that leveraged finance significandy increases the 
debt-to-equity ratio of enterprises and more importandy, there is concern that there will 
be pressure from banks for these firms to repay loans and as thus, these repayments 
could eventually tie up working capital and cash-flows. The ultimate implication is that 
vendor/leveraged finance has become so common in the South African corporate sector 
due to the fact that buyers have neither capital of their own nor the ability to raise 
traditional finance. 
BEE and The Implication of Default 
Funding empowerment stakes are legally becoming law and thus represents a challenge 
for the South Africa financial markets. Traditionally, financial markets by their very 
nature have been driven by one motive, profit. The market chooses winners, the 
businesses that have a high probability of returning an investment and an equal 
probability of success. Banks are now asked to play a role in empowerment deals. Banks 
have to find ways to lend money to more firms and to a broader range of individuals 
with higher risk. 
South African banks currendy face an additional burden of knowing that failure of 
empowerment may arise direcdy or indirecdy, as the banks will be placed under pressure 
to facilitate empowerment until it has succeeded. The challenge of providing broad-
based empowerment coupled with widespread lending is simply due to the implicit BEE 
demand of high sustainability and success, however, the reality of business is that many 
fail for the few that succeed. 
The implicit result of BEE deals is that due to the very nature of the funding 
mechanisms there is an additional burden of debt on almost all listed firms books. This 
notion clearly states, that BEE and the associated debt costs increase the overall risk of 
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firms, and more so for the banks providing this type of finance. However, this paper 
does not focus on any financial firms, but the implicit BEE demand would cause the 
rational thinker to infer that financial firms in South African are seen to be more risky. 
Many of the funding structures typically require the BEE partner to service the debt 
obligations from the dividends that are currendy received from the empowerment stake 
in the firm. In the US, historically, it can be shown that as a firm nears default the 
reaction of managers is to cut dividends in order to generate adequate cash for the 
service of outstanding debt obligations. However, in South Africa, due to the advent of 
BEE, it will not be possible for any firm to cut their dividends at they near default, and 
as thus, empowerment dividends can be seen to be implicit debt. Tbis is due to the fact 
that the BEE partner would not be able to service the debt obligations without the 
associated dividend income stream. 
Tbis assumption regarding dividends has to be incorporated into the Merton (1974) 
model. These assumptions of dividends are incorporated into two scenarios, the base-
case and worst-case scenario respectively. Under the base-case scenario, it is assumed 
that dividends are paid, and as thus, the empowerment structure has an income stream 
to service the debt obligations. In the worst-case scenario the dividends of the firm are 
able to drop to zero (as they currendy do in the US). Tbis would enable the results to 
display a very conservative worst-type of scenario. The notion of dividends not being 
paid would case an 'inferred' default to occur on the BEE structure, and as thus would 
cause the probability of default to increase under this scenario. The measurement of 
BEE debt and the associated dividends are discussed in the assumption section to 
follow. 
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Model Inputs and Assumptions 
The Company Selection Process 
For the purposes of this paper, only non-financial companies have been selected. This is 
due to the business nature of financial institutions being considerably different to that of 
industrialised firms. The nature of financial firms affects the model as such in the setting 
of the Default Point. The Default Point for financial firms would have to be adjusted, 
generating incomparable results with other firms. The FTSE JSE index series are 
currently reviewed quarterly with the latest index constituents being finalized on 31 
March 2007. In order to obtain at least a short time series data for further comparison, 
only companies that have been incorporated into the index at least two years prior to 
March 2007 have been included in the sample. This is due to the fact that equity 
volatility remains a key input of default prediction model. The two-year window frame 
ensures that the stock has adequate daily stock price data and liquidity. 
Where the company is dual listed and/ or has multi-national operations the following 
assumptions shall prevail: 
The company will be treated entirely as a South African entity, thereby, all outstanding 
debt will be assumed to be denominated in (ZAR). Where financial derivative 
instruments have been used for risk management purposes, it is assumed that all 
instruments such as currency and interest rate swaps are swapped back into the domestic 
currency (ZAR) and an equivalent domestic floating interest rate such as JIBAR (Ibe 
Johannesburg Inter-bank Agreed Rate) has been used. This would ensure that a 
conservative approach would be used throughout the study. The assumption of only 
ZAR debt is rather restrictive as many firms obtain international finance and thus have 
interest payment and operations denominated in other currencies. However, if market 
conditions deteriorate rapidly, the emerging market and contagion nature would cause 
South African firms to default first. 
Page 37 
Forecasting Time Horizon 
Within credit risk literature and modelling, it is common to use a one-year (T = 1) time 
horizon for debt maturity and subsequent estimation of default probability. As Kulkarni 
et al. (2005) argue, one year is perceived as being of sufficient length for a bank to raise 
additional capital on account of increases in portfolio credit risk (if any). The one-year 
convention may ha e arisen largely because, until recendy, default probabilities and 
rating transition matrices were most easily available at a one-year horizon, with such data 
forming key inputs to conventional credit risk models. 
Market Value of Equity 
The value of equity E , is found simply as the number of shares outstanding at the time 
of the finalization of the index constituents and the share price on that day, namely 31 
March 2007. The market capitalization, number of shares outstanding as well as the 
share price used are published in the FfSE JSE index review March 2007. 
Setting the Default Point 
The Default Point is defined as the threshold, which when crossed, triggers default. (In 
reality, the default point is also a random variable). In particular, firms will often adjust 
their liabilities as they near default. It is common to observe the liabilities of commercial 
and industrial firms increase as they near default while the liabilities of financial 
institutions often decrease as they approach default. 
In the case where a firm's liabilities would consist only of a single, zero-coupon bond 
(i.e. the assumptions of the original Merton model), the Default Point would be the face 
value of this debt D . However, because this form of financing is highly unlikely to exist, 
some other measure of the Default Point has to be introduced. To be consistent with 
the theoretical Merton model from the previous section, this estimated Default Point is 
also labelled D . 
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Some authors of the credit risk literature 32 consider the Default Point D to be equal to 
the book value of total liabilities. Other authors however suggest that it is more rational 
to estimate D as D = STL + LTL where STL is the book value of the companies' 
short-term liabilities (debt due in one year) and LTL is the book value of long-term 
debt. Both of these variables are easily obtainable from the annual reports of the 
comparues. 
Tills proxy is based on the observations of Moody's KMV, which has found from a 
sample of several hundred companies that firms default when the asset value reaches a 
level somewhere between the value of total liabilities and the value of short-term debt. 
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) show that the model is surprisingly robust to the precise level 
of the liabilities. 
The South African case represents a rather unique proposition with respect to the 
measurement of the face value of firm debt. Tills relates to the fair value and discount 
treatment of BEE transactions in the financial statements of listed South African firms 
under IFRS 2 33 (Share Based Payments). If the transaction was conducted at a discount, 
the transaction will be treated as being part of the debt of the firm, this is due to the fact 
that an expense is recognized in the income statement immediately due to the associated 
costs of the transaction. This cost shall be reversed from the income statement and thus 
form part of the face value of short-term debt. The fair value approach assumes that 
there will be no erosion to the equity structure of the firm, thus causing neither an 
increase in debt or liability with respect to the transaction. 
32 e.g. Hillegeist et al. (2004) 
33 International Financial Reporting Standards 
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Aggregate Measur of Debt 
All long-term and short-term interest bearing borrowings will be included, specifically 
interest bearing debt due within the following year. Preference share capital is assumed 
to redeem within th redeemable portion due within the following year. If the firm has 
any convertible loan outstanding, the option to conversion has been taken into account 
within the next year. If the firm has conducted a BEE transaction at discount, the 
expense, which was recognized in the Income Statement in prior years, will form part of 
the face value of debt. For simplicity purposes liabilities that do not bear an implicit 
interest charge, such as deferred tax liabilities and pension liabilities will not be taken 
into account. 
The liabilities of subsidiaries are not adjusted, which are currendy consolidated at 100 
percent on a consolidated balance sheet even though the parent company may not own 
100 percent of the subsidiary. Joint Ventures are incorporated on a line-by-line basis in 
the actual percentage of participation. Associate companies merely represent an 
investment by the parent and thus liabilities of the Associate are accounted for within 
the parent. 
This study further assumes that at any time between the publication of two annual 
reports, market participants behave as if the actual debt level were the one reported in 
the most recent ann al report. 
Setting the Interest Rate 
The original Merton model assumes a risk free rate of interest as the model computes 
risk-neutral probabilities of default. A one-year forward financing rate is used for the 
calculation of the 'real-world' probabilities of default. The one-year forward rate has 
been calculated from the 1YR and 2YR swap rates from value date 10 June 2007, 
direcdy after the latest SObps increase in interest rates. The Repo rate increased from 
12.5% to 13.0% on this day. 
IYRSwap 
2YRSwap 





This rate has been assumed to be the short-term financing rate applicable within one-
year. The rationale is that the swap curve is seen to be the most reliable perception of 
the markets feelings towards floating short-term interest rates namely, JIBAR 
Gohannesburg Inter-bank Agreed Rate) in the future. JIBAR can be seen as the AAA 
corporate yield as quoted in the domestic inter-bank market. Some corporate firms are 
currently rated by rating agencies and have certain listed debt (if any), which has in 
addition, been rated independently. Independent ratings on corporate debt would be the 
ascent of listed securitisation tranches by firms who securitize their books. 
For the purposes of the study the following spreads over the 1 YR forward financing rate 
will be applicable for the following rating categories. This paper further provides a base-
case and a worst-cas scenario over which the default probabilities will be calculated. 
It must be noted that firms do not follow homogenous financing and capital structures 
and the table below would be used as reasonability check as to rates used in the default 
prediction model. E ach firm has to provide details of their financing in the notes to the 
annual financial statements under the notes Interest Bearing Borrowings and Risk 
Management. Generally details of the average interest rates applicable on current finance 
are provided if the rates are fixed. Where there is no indication of rates and the firm is 
currently being financed at JIBAR, the following spreads and rates below will prevail and 






























































































The spread difference between the base and worst-case results in a differential of 
200bps. Thus, it is assumed that over the next year, the Repo 34 rate will on average 
increase by 200bps. This 200bps would be indicative of only the worst case-scenario. It 
should be noted that the move from the base-case to the worst-case is about 3 notches 
in the table above. 
The monetary policy committee of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 'the central 
bank' meets eight times throughout the year, and thus, on average raises interest rates by 
SObps if need be. This would entail that four rate rises are assumed throughout the year 
in this paper. The general reason for the SO bps increment opposed a 1 OObps increment, 
is due to the fact that a 1 OObps hike would generally 'shock' the South African markets 
in an event of crisis. Being conservative in the worst-case market scenario, the paper 
assumes two rate hikes of 100bps each. It is further assumed that all AAA firms will be 
able to obtain finance at the short-term forward financing rate plus a marginal spread of 
68bps and 268bps under the base and worst-case scenario respectively. 
The rationale behind the construction of the spreads is that all ratings below BBB are 
assumed to be financed at Prime. Historically the resultant spread between 3M JIBAR 
and prime is assumed to be on average 3.5%. It is further assumed that the one-year 
forward financing rate would be an equivalent short-term rate such as 3M JIBAR in the 
future. This as sump ·on provides a spread of 3.38% over the financing rate for all BBB 
firms as seen highlighted in the table above. 
34 The South African Repurchase Rate - See: The South African Reserve Bank 
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Computing The Asset Pay-Out Rate 
The asset payout rate, 8 , is a combination of the financing rate paid on the firms 
current borrowings combined with the rate of common and preferred dividends. 
It is assumed that the most recendy reported dividend yield would be constant and 
applicable over the following year. This assumption is based on the idea that 
management tries to maintain a constant dividend payment over time. If the firm has 
preference shares currendy outstanding, the preference share rate will be used, however 
scaled down by the preference share weighting in the overall capital structure. 
Due to the advent of BEE transactions in South Africa, two scenarios are assumed with 
respect to the asset payout ratio. Most firms will not able to cut their dividend to zero 
due to the various BEE financing structures as well as general market sentiment towards 
the firms share price. However, if the firm is on the brink of default, the model allows 
under the worst-case scenario that the dividend portion of the payout rate to drop to 
zero. 
Computing The Equity Drift 
The market return on assets flE , can be calculated based on the actual return on assets 
for the entire year. However, the actual return on assets over the last year may be 
negative. This contradicts financial theory where the expected returns cannot be negative 
and cannot be lower than the risk-free rate. One way of dealing with this problem is to 
set the growth rate equal to the risk-free rate of return in the cases, where flE , would be 
otherwise negative or lower than the riskless rate 35. The risk free rate is assumed to be 
the forward financing rate as discussed above. 
Thus, flE (t) is calculated as follows: 
(t)=Ma{S(t) +Dividends-S(t-l) r] 
~ s«-n · 
35 Hillegeist et al (2004) 
Page 43 
Alternatively, flE , could be calculated from the CAPM model, assuming the risk free 
rate is represented by the forward financing rate of 9.62% coupled with a South African 
domestic equity risk premium of 300bps. 
It is assumed that 300bps would be indicative of the market risk premium for South 
Africa. The rationale is that if the firm has a beta of 1, combined with the financing rate 
of 9.62%, the resultant equity drift would equate to 12.62%. Thus, the firm's assets will 
grow at a rate marginally higher than the current Prime rate of 12.5% 36 within a discrete 
framework, or alternatively 11.88% in a continuous a framework. 
The betas of all firms used in the sample are provided by Cadiz FSG. In order to be 
consistent with the sample selection, the betas have been used to coincide with the latest 
FfSE JSE Top 40 index constituents, which were finalized on March 2007. 
For the purposes of the study, the expected return will be calculated using the CAPM 
model. Under the two scenarios, the base case expected return would simply represent 
current market conditions as calculated by the CAPM model, whilst the expected return 
under the worst-case scenario would simply be represented by the forward financing rate 
of 9.62%. It is important to err on the conservative side under the worst-case scenario in 
terms of the equity drift/ expected return. 
36 Prime Rate as at June 2007- See: The South African Reserve Bank 
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Computing The Asset Drift 
The asset drift of the finn is calculated from the theoretical relationship between the 
expected return on assets J.lv and the expected return on equity J.1 E . By combing the 
option Greeks with the stochastic process for equity the following relationship emerges 
for J.lv, where J.1E is calculated from the CAPM model with 5 being the asset payout of 
the firm. 
J.lv = 
Computing Equity Volatility 
0 Equity Theta 
r Equity Gamma 
11 EquityDelta 
The volatility of equity cr E can be estimated from historical stock return data. cr E 1s 
computed as an annualised standard deviation of daily returns over one year, with the 
returns being expre sed using continuous compounding. Stock price data is obtained 
over the last 252 observations for the period March 2006 to March 2007. The period will 
ensure that the study matches the calculated volatility with the latest index constituents 
as well as the market capitalization on that day. It is assumed that an annualisation factor 
of 252 will be applied to the daily volatility calculations. 
The appropriate siz of T in calculating volatility with daily data has to be considered. 
Hull (2002) suggests T between 90 and 180 trading days (in order to take account of the 
fact that volatility is time varying. It is assumed for the purposes of this study that 252 
points of daily data would be sufficient in calculating equity volatility. 
An alternative approach in estimating equity volatility would be to use implied volatility. 
The implied volatility of equity can be extracted from the market prices of options 
currently traded. The implied volatility is simply the volatility calculated using the Black-
Scholes formulae that equates the value of the option equal to the current market value 
of the option. Thes volatilities can be calculated using the Newton-Raphson algorithm, 
however, the listed option market in South Africa has still to be developed for 
meaningful data to be used. 
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CADIZ in association with the Johannesburg Stock exchange has recently released a 
market wide volatility indicator known as the SA VI 37 (The South African Volatility 
Index). This measure has been calculated using the implied volatility of options currently 
listed on the Top 40 firms that are currently actively traded. This measure represents a 
forward-looking 90-day measure of future market volatility. The obvious disadvantage of 
using this measure is that it represents a holistic market measure as opposed to 
individual firm implied volatility. As of yet, there are not enough actively traded listed 
options on all firms in our sample to use the implied volatility measure. To combat this 
problem we turn to the GARCH (Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity) approach as a composite measure of volatility. 
GARCH Approach To Measure Volatility 
The GARCH (1,1) model has been implemented as a reasonability check to the volatility 
as calculated above. The GARCH model simply states, that the forecast of tomorrow's 
volatility is dependant on today's volatility and today's shock. 
The GARCH model recognizes that in practice variance tends to get pulled back to a 
long-run average le el and thus incorporates mean reversion. The same time horizon 
and annualisation factor is used as above. For the implementation of the GARCH 
model, it is assumed that returns are unpredictable. The Steps in estimating the 
parameters involve maximum likelihood methods. The MLM process involves choosing 
values for the parameters that maximize the chance (or likelihood) of the data actually 
recurnng. 
37 See the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for the latest figure currendy published on the SAFEX website 
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The steps .in estimat.ing the GARCH parameters are outlined below: 
1. It is assumed that the probability distribution of returns conditional on the 
variance is normal. 
2. Equity returns are computed, where r(t) = ln(S1) -ln(S1 -1). 
3. The variance for the first observation is set to the unconditional variance: 
252 
Sl
2 = IVar(rt) 
i=l 
4. The initial values of the parameters of the model are set as follows: 
a= 0.1 
f3 = 0.85 
252 
Ivar(rt) 
OJ= _:_i=_,_l _ _ 
(1- a- /3) 
5. The conditional variance for the second and third observations and so forth for 
the time horizon are constructed according the formulae below: 
6. The log-likelihood of each observation is computed by the follow.ing formula 
below: 
This can be .interpreted as a measure of the relative probability that the GARCH 
model with the parameters specified generate the data that is actually observed. 
7. The final step .in implementing the GARCH model would be to maximize the 
sum of the daily calculated log-likelihood function with respect to the parameters 
a and p respectively. 
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For the base-case scenario it is assumed that the current market conditions that prevailed 
over the last year will continue to prevail over the following year, thus, the volatility of 
equity is set equal to the unconditional variance as calculated above. 
To incorporate possible market conditions as the firm nears default incorporating one 
and two sigma events, the standard deviation of the daily volatility measure is calculated. 
The volatility measure is therefore increased by one or two standard deviations for the 
worst-case scenario measure of volatility respectively. 
Value of the Firms Assets and the Volatility of the Assets 
This paper assumes that the Newton Raphson iterative algorithm will be used in solving 
the system of two non-liner equations simultaneously. In order to solve these equations, 
initial estimates of the value of the firm's assets as well as the volatility of the firm's asset 
process is required. An approximate of V is obtained where V = E + D and for 0" v , 
Moody's KMV propose an initial value for O" v = O" E(_E __ ). After the initial estimates 
E+D 
have been set, the systems of non-linear equations (as seen below) are solved for the 
variables V and 0" v subject to the constraints V > 0, 0" v > 0 . 
E(V, D)= CY.e-
5 
N (d1) V 
(J"e 
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Alternative Estimation Procedures 
From the perspective of the estimation procedures and the methodology as outlined so 
far in this paper, there are however, alternative approaches that have been employed in 
the past to deal with variants of the Merton (1974) model, specifically with respect to 
solving the system of non-linear equations and estimates of the firm's asset volatility 
process. 
This paper assumes and employs the same methodology as Moody's KMV in setting the 
initial fum asset volatility. However, alternative and suggested approach, is to estimate 
the initial value of the assets or the initial leverage ratio which can be used to calculate 
the firms asset volatility. This procedure is currendy employed by earlier studies such as 
Jones et al. (1984), a d Delianedis and Geske (2003), among others. 
Following on their studies, Eom et al. (2004) suggest that firm asset volatility can be 
derived by computing the annualised volatility of the firm's assets from annual balance 
sheet data. Although, this seems intuitively appealing, this would cause the sample of 
firms to drop significandy, as Eom et al. (2004) suggest approximately 5 to 10 years of 
balance sheet data is required for an adequate measurement of firm asset volatility. 
Furthermore, this paper assumes that the Newton Raphson iterative algorithm as 
suggested in Hull (2002) shall be used in solving the system of two non-linear equations. 
A critique of this of this methodology as outlined in Crosbie and Bohn (2003), is that 
two key equations; 
E(V,D) = a ve-
5 
N (d1) V 
(j e 
hold only instantan ously, since in reality both the leverage ratio and the hedge ratio, 
N(d1), of individual firms are not adequately stable for the algorithm to provide 
meaningful estimates. The algorithm forces a stochastic variable to be constant. To 
combat this problem Crosbie and Bohn (2003), suggest a more complicated iterative 
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procedure for solving the system of non-linear equations. This iterative procedure 38 
follows in setting the initial value of a v =a E(-E-) as proposed by Moody's KMV. 
E+D 
The value of a v and the equation as seen below: 
E(V ,D) = ve-o(T-t) N(di)- De -r(T-t) N(d2) + (1- e-OT ) v 
are used to infer the market value of firm's assets for every day of the previous year. The 
implied log return of the firm's assets for each day is calculated and these returns series 
are used to generate new estimates of a v which is used for the next round of iteration. 
The iteration on a v is repeated in this manner until the values of a v from two 
consecutive iterations converge. 
Once the converged value of a v is obtained, it is used to back out V throughout the 
For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the Newton Raphson method shall be 
an adequate algorithm in solving for the unknown variables of V and a v in spite of the 
argument against this method as outlined in Crosbie and Bohn (2003). 
There remains a wealth of other methodologies currently employed to deal with variants 
of the Merton (1974) model, however these methods base their variable estimates from 
the key factors as outlined in this section. 
38 See Bharath and Shumway (2004) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) for further discussion 
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Results 
The implementation of the Merton (1974) structural model has so far received little 
attention within South African academic literature. This paper attempts to implement 
the adjusted Merton (197 4) model by incorporating all methodologies as published by 
Moody's KMV. The finn sample currently excludes all financial finns; the notion behind 
this is that the default barrier defining industrial and financial finns would have to be 
adjusted generating incomparable results among the sample of finns. 
The probabilities of default are calculated for the top 42 non-financial finns currently 
listed on the JSE. The notion behind the choice of these finns is that equity volatility 
remains one of the key inputs in the Merton (1974) model. These finns represent the 
most liquid and actively traded stocks on the JSE and as thus it is assumed that the 
equity volatility of individual finns would be directly comparable. 
The probabilities of default are considered under two scenarios, the base-case and the 
worst-case respectively. For the base-case scenario it is assumed that the input variables 
that prevailed over the last year will continue to prevail over the following year, thus all 
the variables in the model are set to current market conditions/ estimates. The worst-
case scenario assumes a more stringent set of input variables as it is assumed that in an 
event of a market crisis, these variables would be more applicable. 
Table 1 to follow ranks the sample of finns analysed in terms of their probability of 
default, from Rank 1 (most likely to default) to Rank 42 Oeast likely to default.). In 
addition, Table 1 provides the current rank of the firm on the JSE. 
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Table 1: Firm Rank according to the Probability of Default 
Probability of Default (Bps) 
Ticker JSE Rank Defualt Rank Base Worst 
NTC 34 1 65.3141220286 202.9391945941 
SAP 35 2 38.2810273339 137.0560246012 
ANG 14 3 0.2748151766 8.1630729029 
IPL 30 4 0.17 48030430 9. 7636485862 
BAW 29 5 0.0870744702 0.1331957475 
SOL 7 6 0.0312686589 0.4838321481 
SHF 32 7 0.0131680034 0. 7863865459 
MTN 6 8 0.0027506730 0.1649722740 
WHL 39 9 0.0021388954 0.0962981071 
HAR 26 10 0.0018816367 0.0915411257 
ARI 38 11 0.0012399078 0.0076534113 
KIO 28 12 0.0007534043 0.0169206564 
NPN 20 13 0.0002658222 0. 06596307 46 
BVT 24 14 0.0002244741 0.1359622098 
NPK 52 15 0.0001703643 0.1415990752 
BIL 2 16 0.0000754204 0.0055929324 
SHP 51 17 0.0000314772 0.3314965994 
ILV 74 18 0.0000197142 0.0017327245 
TRU 42 19 0.0000154004 0.0350558637 
JDG 44 20 0.0000109306 0.0095971039 
GFI 15 21 0.0000059586 0.0275876123 
MUR 40 22 0.0000051475 0.0600656867 
AVI 83 23 0.0000033409 0.0003687128 
IMP 11 24 0.0000020230 0.0003784676 
MLA 23 25 0.0000014655 0.0000762889 
FOS 46 26 0.0000009182 0.0015290487 
SUI 47 27 0.0000008423 0.0000193092 
TKG 13 28 0.0000007587 0.0000833082 
MPC 73 29 0.0000005237 0.0000106647 
TBS 31 30 0.0000002947 0.0007966025 
LON 17 31 0.0000000402 0.0000409606 
NCL 93 32 0.0000000333 0.0000278718 
MSM 43 33 0.0000000014 0.0000045576 
AGL 1 34 0.0000000005 0.0000345855 
PPC 36 35 0.0000000002 0.0000003569 
SAB 3 36 0.0000000000 0.0000000652 
SPP 71 37 0.0000000000 0.0000006452 
ECO 33 38 0.0000000000 0. 0000000635 
RCH 5 39 0.0000000000 0.0000000215 
PIK 45 40 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 ' 
AMS 4 41 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 
REM 16 42 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 
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It can be seen that the overall default probabilities under both scenarios are less than one 
basis point (1 bp) bar firms NTC and SAP. It can also be seen that firms included in the 
lower part of the JSE raking are seen to exhibit higher probabilities of default. The 
probabilities of default can be seen to drop significantly for the rest of the sample firms 
after NTC and SAP. It would be plausible to discuss these two firms in detail and show 
how each firm is analysed and presented in Appendix B prior to a discussion of the 
overall results. Table 2 below represents an extract from Appendix B showing the 
variables used for the base-case scenario for NTC and SAP respectively: 
Table 2: NTC and SAP Model Inputs 
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The firms SAP and NTC both exhibit very leveraged capital structures in relation to the 
sample with resultant debt-to-equity ratios of 118% and 74% respectively, furthermore 
the financial statements of these firms state that finance is generally obtained at Prime 
(SAP), however, NTC obtains finance at Prime less 200bps. For the purposes of this 
paper the interest rate coupled with the spreads used in the table above are assumed to 
be indicative of the forward Prime rate applicable for NTC and SAP over the next year 
within a continuou framework. The payout rate can further be seen to be a 
combination of the forward financing rate combined with the asset leakages of the firm's 
in the form of divide ds and interest payments. 
It is common knowledge that volatility gready affects the value of an option, and thus, in 
the Merton (197 4) model, the volatility of the firm asset's cr v would gready affect the 
default probability in the very short-term. The intuition behind this notion is that as 
asset volatility is sharply increased, there is a higher possibility of the asset value process 
crossing the threshold barrier triggering default. This notion can schematically be 
represented and further explained by Figure 2 and Table 3 below. 
Figure 2: Value of the firms Assets and the Default Point 
'o 
Market value 
of assets (V) 
Probability of Default 
Source: Moody's KMV and Crouhy et al. (2000 
T 
Distribution of the 
asset value at time T 
- - • - • Default Point 
Time 
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Figure 2 shows the random possible asset value path of the firm over the horizon period 
with the development of the fum's asset value at the end of year-one. The expected 
growth in the asset value of the fum is commonly referred to as the asset drift and is also 
schematically represented. It can be seen that the market value of the firm's assets can 
fluctuate (as measured by asset volatility) above the default threshold labelled the default 
point. The distant-to-default measure is simply the standard deviation of the firm's asset 
volatility i.e. how many standard deviations the fum's asset value process is away from 
the default point. 
Table 3: Value of the NTC and SAP Assets 
NTC SAP 
Value of Assets 51 .08 rvalue of Assets 40.57 
Asset Volatility 17.0% f,sset Volatility 24.6% 
Market Value of Debt 26.30 Market Value of Debt 16.06 
Debt to Assets 51% Debt to Assets 40% 
Probability of default 0.65314122% Probability of default 0.38281027% 
Table 3 shows the Merton (1974) model's output in calculating the asset volatility and 
the implied market value of the firm and its debt. The market value of debt is simply the 
difference between the implied firm value less the firm's market capitalisation. These 
values are obtained by solving the two key non-linear equations simultaneously for 
variables V and CY v . 
With respect to Table 3, it can be seen that the Debt to Asset ratio for NTC and SAP is 
calculated to be 51 % and 40% respectively. This shows that 51% and 40% of these 
firms' assets are currently financed by debt. 
These ratios clearly show the large amount of debt drawn in the capital structures. This 
leverage thus implies that the values of NTC's and SAP's assets are far closer to the 
default threshold than the reaming firms in the sample. The reason behind this is that 
NTC and SAP both obtain finance at high rates of interest and have higher leakages 
from their market values. These high leakages cause the possible path of the fum's 
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market value to decrease more rapidly over time i.e. until t = 1 (one-year) in the model. 
When combining the asset volatilities of 17% and 24.6% for NTC and SAP with the 
possible path of their lower market values, the fluctuation of these assets can be seen to 
cross the default threshold more often thus triggering default. 
The option Greeks, or specifically the equity delta can provide further indication of the 
equity value of the finn. As equity is seen to be a call option on the finn's assets with 
the strike price equal to the face value of debt; the delta in this framework shows that as 
the value of equity rises, the value of finn's assets increases. The deltas for both NTC 
and SAP are seen to be highly positive indicating that as debt is increased in the capital 
structure, the delta would decreases, implying a lower equity value in relation to the 
finn's total assets. This shows that the model of default prediction, and thus the default 
probability is greatly sensitive for the firms NTC and SAP with respect to the value of 
the finn assets and their associated volatilities. This notion can further be seen in the 
sensitivity of delta when measured by the positive gamma. The high sensitivities can be 
explained by the leverage employed in the capital structures. When combining the 
theoretical relationship between the expected return on assets and the expected return 
on equity the asset drift can be calculated and will further be explained below. 
Following on Figure 2, the possible path of the market value of the finn includes the 
expected growth in asset value or asset drift. When considering the asset drifts, the drifts 
for NTC and SAP are seen to be negative 0.796% and 3.112% respectively. The negative 
drift contradicts financial theory where expected returns cannot be negative and cannot 
be lower than the risk-free rate. A way of dealing with this problem is to set the growth 
rate of assets equal to the risk-free rate, or more applicable in this study, the forward 
financing rate. NTC is the only firm to exhibit a negative asset drift in the sample of 
firms. The asset drift for NTC is set to a marginal rate of 1.556% and 0.778% under the 
base-case and worst-case scenario respectively. The 1.566% represents the difference 
between the equity drift and the asset-payout percentage of the firm. This rate assumes 
that due to the larg leverage and high payouts in this finn there would be 1.556% of 
capital for reinvestment purposes. 
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It can be seen that NTC's and SAP's asset drifts are substantially lower than when 
compared to the sample mean of 7.6%. These low asset drifts in conjunction with high 
leakages cause the possible path of the market value to decrease substantially quicker 
over time (when compared to the sample) causing the probability of reaching the default 
threshold to increase. 
NTC and SAP exhibit debt-to-equity ratios of 118% and 74% respectively; and when 
compared to the sample mean of 14.26%. These firms can be seen to remain the most 
leveraged. The high probabilities of default for NTC and SAP as seen in Table 1 stem 
from the combination of their leverage with higher payout's and their low standard 
deviation of asset volatility measure. Furthermore, a decreasing market value process 
caused by higher payouts and low asset drifts for these firms cause the probability to 
further be increased when compared to the sample. 
The probabilities of default for NTC and SAP as calculated by the Merton (1974) model 
cause these firms to be seen as the most risky over the next year. However, no 
consideration has been made for cession/ security on NTC's and SAP's leverage. 
Property and fixtures totalling 90% of the total debt amount outstanding secure NTC's 
debt. This property is considered to be highly marketable thus enabling NTC to use 
leverage in the capital structure. SAP on the other hand has 80% of its debt in the form 
of unsecured bank loans with the remaining 20% in the form of publicly traded bonds 
with specific financial covenants and pledged cession/ security. 
When comparing NTC and SAP to their associated probabilities of default, knowledge 
of NTC's cession/ security clearly contradicts the notion of NTC being the most risky 
firm as calculated by the Merton (1974) model. A rational thinker would thus infer SAP 
being more risky than NTC due to the presence of only 20% cession/ security for bonds 
outstanding. 
The bias in probabilities calculated is unfortunately a flaw in the model, as 
security/cession is unfortunately not taken into account. The Merton (1974) model is 
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question of whether one should take a trade-off between the errors owing to a purely 
quantitative assessment opposed to a biased judgmental analysis of a firm's soft facts. 
Combing back to the overall ranking of the firms in Table 1, the remaining firms in the 
sample are seen to have probabilities of less than 1 bps. These firms can be seen to have 
an asset value process that will hardly trigger the default barrier even if the asset volatility 
is seen to be high. The idea behind this result is that most of these firms exhibit 
relatively higher asset drifts and have market capitalisations in excess of their serviced 
debt amount. These factors when combined, enable the default threshold to be further 
away from the valu of the firm's assets, thus causing the low probabilities as seen in 
Table 1. 
Following on the notion above, the overall ranking of the firms in Table 1 can be 
analyzed in terms of the standard deviation of asset volatility and the amount of serviced 
debt. The Merton (1974) model states that a higher distant-to-default or asset volatility 
standard deviation would imply being further from the default threshold (the serviced 
debt amount) thus implying, a lower probability of default. To test if this notion in fact 
holds in the sample of the firms analysed, the variables standard deviation and the asset 
volatilities are graphically represented below in Figure 3. 
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The hypothesis of the Merton (1974) model conforms to the sample of the firms 
analysed. As seen in Figure 3 above, the standard deviation of the asset volatility 
increases as the probability of default declines as measured from the ranking in Table 1 
(rank 1-most likely to default, to rank 42-least likely). Figure 3 shows clearly why firms 
NTC and SAP (ranked 1 and 2 respectively) have the highest default probabilities. These 
firms have the lowest standard deviations and thus are seen to be closer to their default 
threshold when compared to the sample. 
When considering the relationship between the asset volatility and its standard deviation, 
the relationship seems to be somewhat mixed. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) show that for a 
sharp decrease in market leverage for a finn trending upwards and whose stock prices 
are growing rapidly will lead to an overestimation of the asset volatility and subsequendy 
imply a higher probability of default. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) further state that the 
Merton (1974) mo el biases the probability in exacdy the opposite direction. The 
intuition behind their notion is that as asset volatility is sharply increased, there is a 
higher possibility of the asset value process crossing the threshold barrier triggering 
default. 
This notion is true, however, in the South African case, the finn's asset values (bar NTC 
and SAP) would have to drop severely before any of the finn's possible asset value 
processes (as measured by asset volatility) would breach the default threshold. This is 
due to the fact that most of the firms in the sample have market capitalisations far in 
excess of their serviced debt amount. The Firms ranked 19-24 in the sample exhibit asset 
volatilities in excess of 40%, however, are seen to have probabilities again of less than 
1 bps. This provides further evidence that an increase in asset volatility, combined with 
the lower debt-to-equity ratios would hardly cause the default threshold to be breached. 
The asset volatility measure is further exacerbated and can ultimately be seen to be 
incomparable among firms. This is due to the fact that this measure is calculated from 
finn specific variables in the Merton (197 4) model. It would be impossible to quantify an 














A further test to confirm the hypothesis that the standard deviation of asset volatility 
increases as the serviced debt of the finn is decreased will be presented graphically below 
in Figure 4. The idea is that as the debt amount decreases in the capital structure, the 
standard deviation of asset volatility should increase, as the finn's possible asset value 
process will be further away from the default threshold. 
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Ranking of the Probability of Default 
The sample firms analysed can be seen to confirm to the notion that as debt is 
decreased, the standard deviation of asset volatility is increased. Figure 4 follows the 
same ranking as can be seen in Table 1 (1-most likely to default, and 42-least likely). A 
polynomial trend line has been added to the data to graphically display the general trend 
of the serviced debt data in absence of outliers. It can be seen that most of the firms 
analysed are relatively un-leveraged, which thus caused the higher standard deviation 
measure, and as thus, lowers the probabilities of default. The major outliers as seen in 
Figure 4 are summarized in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Analysis of Data Outliers 
Stock JSE Rank Market Cap (Rm) Serviced Debt (Rm) DIE Std Deviation 
NTC 34 24,776.61 29,224.00 118% 2.65 
SOL 7 143,705.41 34,328.00 24% 4.85 
MTN 6 160,038.40 32,979.00 21% 5.34 
BIL 2 353,562.12 70,124.00 20% 5.96 
AGL 1 530,461 .10 43,736.00 8% 7.77 









The outliers as seen in Table 4 above are discussed below to show why these finns 
exhibit debt amounts in excess of the sample mean (R10, 054.65m) coupled with lower 
probabilities of default. 
This can simply be explained by the market capitalization of the outliers. As seen in 
Table 4 above, these finns have market values far in excess of their serviced debt 
amount with debt-to-equity ratios marginally higher than the sample average of 14.26%. 
These under leveraged structures cause the standard deviation to be higher thus showing 
that the possible asset value path will hardly reach the default threshold. However, when 
comparing the results, these outliers seem to have excess debt; however, this debt has to 
be seen analysed in the context of the entire capital structure. 
The higher standard deviation measures for the rest of the sample finn's results from the 
fact that South African finns can be seen to have relatively un-leveraged capital 
structures. This implies that finns in South Africa opt to rely ultimately on equity 
opposed to debt financing. Further evidence of this notion can be seen in Table 4 in the 
sense that the probability of default decreases with higher market capitalisations. 
Independendy Rated Firms 
It should be noted that most South African finns are not currendy rated by rating 
agencies and in addition, have litde, if any, corporately traded debt on the South African 
Bond Exchange. There remain to be a few finns that are currendy rated and are further 
analysed in the paragraphs to follow. 
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The ratings of these firms are obtained from Bloomberg 39 and are provided by Moody's 
and Fitch. Standard and Poor currendy provide ratings for the finn's in the sample, 
however these ratings have been previously obtained either from Moody's or Fitch. This 
enables the analysis to provide the most robust data set of rated firms within the total 
sample. 
In reality the subsidiary or the parent finn are only rated and therefore it is assumed that 
finn analysed shall carry the same rating as the subsidiary or parent where applicable. 
This section seeks to explain some, if any anomalies of the probabilities of default as 
calculated by theM rton (1974) model and the associated rating as provided from the 
rating agencies. 
It should be noted that most of the rated firms have multi-national operations and are 
dual listed on other exchanges. In addition, there remain to be a few corporate firms that 
are also currendy rated in the firm sample; this can be seen as the accent of the listed 
securitizations currendy being experienced in the South African debt markets. 
For the purposes of this section is necessary to give a brief oudine of the hierarchy of 
the rating categories as assigned by Moody's and Fitch. This hierarchy can be seen in 
Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Rating Categories 
M d I oo ty· s F' h Itc 
Aaa AAA 











C- Default C- Default 
39 Ratings obtained on 1 August 2007 
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Moody's appends numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification 
from Aa through to Caa. The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher 
end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the 
modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category. Fitch uses 
the modifiers + or - to be appended to a rating to denote a relative status within major 
rating categories. 
Firms that are rated at and below Baa3 and BBB- for Moody's and Fitch respectively 
indicate that that the firm can be considered below investment grade and as such may 
possess certain speculative characteristics. The capacity for payment of financial 
commitments is considered adequate but adverse changes in circumstances and 
economic conditions are more likely to impair the firm's capacity. 
The rated firms are displayed graphically in Figure 5, 6 and 7 below as follows: The 
firm's default rank and the associated base-case probability of default are displaced as 
represented in Table 1 (Firm Rank according to the Probability of Default). It should be 
reminded that Rank 1 represents the most likely to default Figure 5 displays the firms 
currendy rated by Moody's. Figure 6 displays the firms currendy rated by Fitch. These 
figures attempt to establish a relationship between ratings and the associated probability 
of default. 
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It is assumed that lower default probabilities are associated with higher rating categories. 
When looking at Figure 5 - the firms rated by Moody's seem to follow a decreasing 
probability of default with an acceding order of quality i.e. from medium-grade (Bat) to 
investment grade (A1) quality. Similarly, Figure 6- ratings provided by Fitch, can be seen 
to follow the same trend (AA- to A). Thus, this analysis clearly shows that the Merton 
(1974) model can be seen as an indicator of the underlining credit risk associated with 
listed firms. The model is able to quantify lower probabilities of default that are inherent 
in firms associated with higher ratings. 
However, there seems to be discrepancy between ratings provided by Moody's and 
Fitch. Moody's firm ratings seem to fall in the lower part of the investment grade 
category while the ratings as provided by Fitch seem to fall in the higher part of the 
investment grate category. This discrepancy can seem to stem from the fact that rating 
agencies are slow to upgrade or downgrade ratings with respect to credit events. The 
data would suggest that Moody's have currendy revised their ratings while Fitch is still 
endeavouring to do o. 
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Therefore given the results thus far, the purpose of agency ratings is to categorize firms 
into homogenous gr ups of default; however, this is not the case in markets such as 
South Africa. Ratings agencies base their probabilities of default from an international 
perspective; therefore, assuming that each rating category in South Africa would equate 
to a homogenous probability would be implausible. The probabilities of default inherent 
in each rating category are seen to be relative probabilities from an international 
perspective. This is due to the notion that currently no firm whether listed on the equity 
or debt markets in South Africa has currently defaulted on its debt and in essence there 
remains to be limited, if any, historical default data with respect to the South African 
markets to empirically test this notion. 
This concept can be illustrated in Figure7 below; whereby all remaining rated firms and 
their default rank and associated base-case probabilities are displayed. 
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It can be seen in Figure 7 above that the remaining rated firms, although ranked in terms 
of decreasing probabilities of default, seem to have ratings that are not in ascending 
order of rating quality. HAR and MLA can be seen to be the data outliers in this case. 
These firms are currently placed in the lowest investment grade category (Baa3 for 
Moody's and BBB- for Fitch), whilst the other firms tend to be placed within the higher 
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part of the investment grade category, however the probabilities of these firms, despite 
their different agency ratings tend to remain the same. Figure 7 above shows that the 
Merton (1974) model does not adequately capture the relationship of a decreasing 
probability with an associated increase in rating quality. Tills result can stem from the 
fact that these default probabilities are so small that the Merton (1974) model cannot 
effectively distinguish between default probabilities and associated ratings within the 
investment grade category. Another plausible reason as mentioned earlier is that rating 
agencies are slow to upgrade or downgrade ratings with respect to changes in credit 
quality. 
The section to follows attempts to explain why HAR and MLA exhibit probabilities of 
default equivalent to those of high investment grated rated firms, while being rated BBB 
and Baa3 respectively. It would be plausible to discuss these data outliers in terms of 
their equity volatility and their associated probabilities of default under the base-case and 
worst-case scenario respectively. 
Data Outliers: HAR and MLA 
The probability of default as calculated by the Merton (1974) model does not adequately 
distinguish these two firms from the remaining rated firms as presented in the previous 
section. These firm will be further analysed in terms of their equity volatility as 
calculated by the GARCH (1,1) model. An output of each firms GARCH (1,1) model is 
presented in the detailed firm analysis within Appendix B. 
The Merton (1974) model assumes that the volatility of individual firms stock prices (on 
efficient markets) takes into account the inherent volatility of precious metal prices. For 
HAR and MLA, the respective metal prices that would gready affect these firms 
associated probabili · es of default are that of gold and steel respectively. Figure 8 and 9 
below graphically represent the equity volatility of HAR and MLA over the last year. 
,.< .,. ' "' • • • - .. ' ..._ ~ • ". ~ 
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Figure 8: HAR Equity Volatility 
GARCH (1, 1) Model 
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Figure 9: MLA Equity Volatility 
GARCH (1,1) Model 
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It can be seen that the average volatility of HAR and MLA is 39.67% and 31.08% 
respectively. In addition, these figures clearly show how volatile the HAR and MLA 
stock price is when considering the standard deviation of volatility of 6.98% and 4.6% 
respectively. HAR can be seen to be more volatile than MLA, as the volatility breaches 
the 50% band for most of the sample period. This can be explained by the volatile gold 
price currently experienced over the last year on world-markets being reflected in HAR's 
stock price. In contrast to HAR, MLA's volatility breaches only the 40% band in the 
earlier and later part sample period, while remaining in the 35% band generally. This can 
be seen in the steel price being not as volatile as the gold price over the period analysed. 
When considering the implied asset volatility calculations from the Merton (1974), these 
seem to follow the general trend of increased equity volatility. Unfortunately, the asset 
volatility cannot graphically be represented over the last year as equity volatility. This is 
due to the fact the this measure is an implied output from the Merton (1974) model as 
calculated from the last year's equity volatility, the value of the finn's assets and its 
associated liabilities. However, the asset volatility for these two firms remain higher 
when compared to the sample mean of 32%. 
As equity volatility remains one of the key inputs in the Merton (1974) model, it can be 
shown how the probabilities of default increase substantially from the base-case to the 
worst-case scenario. This is due to the fact that the worst-case scenario uses a one 
standard deviation plus input of equity volatility, and as thus, the implied asset volatility 
can be seen to increase with the associated increase in equity volatility. The increase of 
these input variables cause the large deviation of default probabilities between the two 
probabilities under the two scenarios respectively. It should be noted that even with the 
increased asset volatility, these finn's asset value processes (as discussed for NTC and 
SAP previously) would hardly trigger the default threshold, as the market capitalizations 
of these firms' remain well in excess of their serviced debt amount. This clearly shows 
why the probabilities for HAR and MLA as seen in the base-case and worst-case are far 
below 1 bps respecti ely. 
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Crosbie and Bohn (2003) show that the probabilities of default as calculated by the 
Merton (1974) model are biased precisely in the wrong direction for firms with sharp 
decreases in market leverage and whose stock prices are growing rapidly. This notion 
clearly explains the results obtained in the previous section when comparing the rating 
of HAR and MLA to their associated probabilities of default. These probabilities 
intuitively should be higher for the firms HAR and MLA, as these firms are rated BBB 
and Baa3 respectively when compared to the high investment grade rating of the 
remaining rated firms in Figure 7 previously. The firms HAR and MLA have equity 
prices that are seen to be bolstered by higher metal prices over the last year. The impact 
of these higher metal prices causes the stocks of these two firms to grow rapidly and 
affect the equity volatility calculations as seen in Figures 8 and Figure 9 respectively. 
'The impact of higher equity volatility with rapidly growing stock prices in conjunction 
with low leverage tends to overestimate the asset volatility as implied in the Merton 
(1974) model' 40• This overestimation causes the standard deviation of asset volatility to 
be higher for the firms HAR and MLA respectively. This higher standard deviation 
measures implies b ing further away from the default threshold, thus lowering the 
probability of default, and in this case, biasing the probabilities of default in precisely the 
wrong direction. This factor can be seen as one reason as to why the firms HAR and 
MLA are seen to have equivalent probabilities to the remaining high investment grade 
rated firms, while being rated BBB and Baa3 respectively. 
Unfortunately due to the few firms that are rated in the sample further analysis of this 
kind could not be conducted, and in addition HAR and MLA are seen to be the only 
data outliers while all other rated firms tend to follow a general trend. A conclusion 
drawn from this analysis is that the Merton (197 4) model cannot effectively distinguish 
between default probabilities and the associated ratings within the investment grade 
category. This notion can further be seen in that the remaining rated firms tend to 
hover within the investment grade-rating category hierarchy displaying similar 
probabilities of default. 
40 See Crosbie and Bohn (2002) 
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Discussion of the Original Merton (1974) Model 
The Merton model is able to compensate for a number of deficiencies of traditional 
credit analysis if correcdy specified. The model provides a methodology to effectively 
include the market's perception of a firm into credit analysis by combing the markets 
view of forward financing rates, equity values and their associated volatilities. 
The basic idea of Merton's structural approach is to relate the default probability of a 
certain firm to its as et value and volatility. This makes the Merton (1974) model very 
intuitive with calculations being not prohibitively difficult to calculate. The main 
advantage of the asset value-based approaches is that the information that will be 
incorporated into the model is inherendy future orientated because equity prices (on 
efficient markets) reflect the future prospects of firms. 
Unlike accounting-based models (such as the Altman Z-score's and Ollison 0-score's), 
the structural model incorporates the measure of asset volatility, which is a crucial 
variable in bankruptcy prediction. The Merton (1974) model instandy reflects the actual 
credit risk of the firm because the share prices change almost continuously. Therefore, 
the probability of default can be estimated at any point in time for any publicly traded 
firm regardless of the time period and industry. 
If default probabilities were published and actively calculated, firms could be individually 
assessed on a day-to-day basis enabling risk profiles to be evaluated without the 
associated balance sheet time lags. It would be possible to anticipate possible 
deteriorations in credit quality quickly within in a reasonable margin of error. This would 
enable a firms risk profile to be compared on a 'cardinal scale' of a firms relative default 
risk, instead of the more conventional 'ordinal' ranking proposed by rating agencies by 
grouping firms of potentially differing credit risks into homogenous rating categories. A 
common critique of rating agencies is that it takes a substantial amount of time for these 
agencies to make changes to the credit ratings of firms, and in addition, it costs a firm to 
be rated. Using equity values and volatilities to infer default probabilities allows the asset-
based models such as the Merton (1974) model to reflect information faster than credit 
ratings and ultimately assess credit quality in absence of such a rating. 
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Although this argument is theoretically appeasing, this is not necessarily the case because 
the amount of debt drawn by a company is not published on a day-to-day basis but 
rather parallel to the accounting periods. In reality there might be unknown undrawn 
lines of credit that could be used to honor payments and avert a default prior to the 
market receiving this information. 
In Merton (1974) model, each issuer is specific and is characterized by its own asset 
return distribution, its own capital structure and its own default probability. Therefore, 
the default probabilities obtained from the Merton (1974) model are unique numbers 
that are finn specific and direcdy comparable. 
Merton (1974) Model Assumptions 
The assumption that the finn has issued one zero-coupon bond maturing at a specific 
time in the future is highly unrealistic, however an approximate of the face value of this 
zero coupon bond is assumed to be the face value of all liabilities currendy outstanding 
and due within a specific time (i.e. one-year). In addition to the measurement of the this 
so called face value of debt, the model is further deteriorated by the fact that Merton 
considers the concept of default to be only when the total amount of assets is less than 
the total amount of debt at a certain point in time and thus excludes other reasons of 
possible bankruptcy such as temporary liquidity problems, law suits and criminal acts. 
Furthermore, the finn value and firm value volatility would not be justified if the 
differential equation defining the equity value process did not include the expected 
return on the firm value. Merton, therefore, assumes the existence of arbitrageurs who 
imply that the self-financed portfolio consisting of the finn, equity, and risk-less debt 
earn the same risk-free rate as other risk-free securities, independent of the expected 
return. If the portfolio earned more than this return, arbitrageurs could make a risk-less 
profit by shorting the risk-free securities using the proceeds to buy the portfolio; and if 
the portfolio earned less, arbitrages could make a risk-less profit by doing the opposite, 
i.e. by shorting the portfolio and buying risk-free securities. 
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Tbis deficiency is taken into account by calculating a 'real-world' probability by using 
forward financing rates opposed to risk-free rates. The study follows literature 41 
concerning the Merton model, that the expected return can be calculated from the 
theoretical relationship between the differential equation defining the process of equity 
combined with 'option Greeks' and the CAPM model. 
Another deficiency of the model stems from the put-call parity principle translated into 
the capital structure paradigm. As equity is seen as a long call option on the value of the 
firm, the firm's creditors can be considered to hold the short position of the same 
option. Tbis situation between creditors and equity owners is slighdy different from the 
short and long position of an ordinary call option because equity holders remain the 
owners and the managers of the firm in addition to their long option position. Tbis gives 
the equity holders the opportunity to dispose relatively freely of the firm's assets as it 
serves their interests. Creditors, on the other hand, as holders of the short position can 
do litde to prevent this until after a default has occurred, however, Merton assumes the 
original option relationship for simplicity opposed to economic realism. 
The application of Ito's Lemma will continue to remain problematical in the model, as 
Merton assumes that the value of equity is assumed to be solely determined from a 
function of the firm' asset value and time. It has been shown that equity values are not 
only influenced by firm's fundamental economic facts, but are also severely affected by 
speculative tendenci s and market imperfections. Tbis would lead to the price of equity 
containing inefficient information of the firm causing inaccurate estimates of default 
probabilities. 
The assessment of the firms creditworthiness based solely upon the performance of its 
stock price is further deteriorated by the assumption that the value of the firm follows an 
autoregressive proce s. There are many other exogenous factors that could change the 
characteristics of the firm's value. These factors include amongst others; country risk, 
general fluctuations within the economic environment, industry business cycle effects 
and productivity shocks which are currendy ignored in the model. 
41 Hillegeist et AI (2004) 
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Having completely tied down default analysis to a purely quantitative analysis of the firm 
value process, all errors attributable to judgmental analyses could be avoided, however 
judgmental analysis could not be completely ignored but supplemented by the advent of 
a market implied default metric. Merton's model is therefore not an extension or a 
generalization of traditional credit analysis. 
Extensions of the Merton (1974) Model by Moody's KMV 
The many technical assumptions of the Merton model gready diminished its 
practicability for assessing default probabilities. This led the KMV Corporation (now 
Moody's KMV) in the early 1980's to extend the Merton model to a variant, the 
Vasicek-Kealhofer model. 
The Vasicek-Kealhofer model has the same conceptual architecture as the Merton 
approach, but above all tries to weaken and adapt the technical assumptions. While 
Merton assumes the firm's liabilities to only consist of two classes, a debt issue maturing 
on a specific date and equity, Moody's KMV allows liabilities to include current 
liabilities, short-term debt, long-term debt, convertible debt, preferred stock, convertible 
preferred stock, and common equity. 
Moody's KMV takes account of dividend payments and cash payments of interest prior 
to the maturity of the debt and in essence Moody's KMV generalizes the concept of 
default. In the Merton (1974) model, default was equivalent to the firm value being 
lower than the debt at the moment when the debt had to be repaid. In the Vasicek-
Kealhofer model default can happen even before the maturity of a particular debt issue. 
Equity, in this context, has no expiration date, but is modelled as a perpetual option or a 
b . . 42 arner option . 
In the Moody's KMV model, the firm value process is only modelled as a geometric 
Brownian motion £ r the purpose of calculation of the unknown input variables and the 
standard deviation of asset volatility or referred to as the distant-to-default. It had turned 
42 See Hull (2002) for a further discussion on exotic options. 
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out that the mapping of the distance to default measure to default probabilities via the 
lognormal law implied by the geometric Brownian motion led to implausible results. 
The main difference between the classical Merton (1974) model and the Moody's KMV 
model is that the original Merton (1974) model uses the cumulative Normal distribution 
to convert the distances-to-default into default probabilities. However, Moody's KMV 
rightly argues that the probability of default implied from the Normal distribution is far 
too low for adequate measurement, and in addition, the credit curve can be seen to be 
Non-Normal but highly skewed and fat-tailed. This can be seen in Figure 10 below. 








Source: Credit Metrics (1997) JP Morgan Technical Document 
0 Gains 
The resulting distribution of typical credit returns can be seen to have much wider tails 
than the Normal distribution and furthermore, when considering the Normal 
distribution, firms that represent a distant-to-default of more than 3.49 equate to 
probabilities of effectively zero. However, Moody's KMV have shown that firms with 
standard deviations of 4-6 have indeed defaulted 43 • 
43 Measuring & Managing Credit Risk: Understanding the EDF Credit Measure for Public Firms (2004) - Moody's 
KMV 
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Moody's KMV therefore uses its wide historical company database (since 1973) to 
estimate the empirical distribution of distances-to-default and thus calculates default 
probabilities based o this propriety distribution. 
Moody's KMV refers to their default probability as the Expected Default Frequency). 
The distance-to-default is therefore mapped into the Expected Default Frequency for a 
given time horizon. This mapping can be seen in Figure 11 below. 





2 3 4 5 6 7 Distance to Default • DD 
Source: Crosbie and Bohn (2003) 
Referring to Figure 11 above, a distance-to-default of 4 (4 standard deviations away from 
default) would from the Normal distribution imply a zero probability of default, 
however, Moody's KMV maps this distance-to-default of 4 to a default rate of around 
45 bps (0.45%). 
According to the researchers employed by Moody's KMV; they show that the Moody's 
KMV model outperforms the original Merton (197 4) model significandy 44• However, 
the possibility to use the Moody's KMV model and the EDF measures in South Africa is 
questionable. 
44 See: Sobehart and Keenan (1999) 
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The distance-to-default should capture most of the relevant inter-country differences in 
default risk 45 however the different economic prospects for countries are already 
captured by the individual equity and asset valuations. Furthermore, the Moody's KMV 
empirical propriety default distribution is built on publicly listed firms in the United 
States and, as a result, translation to other countries is uncertain. However, Moody's 
KMV claims that their experience internationally has been very good and that over half 
of their customers operate outside of the US. This fact can further be the fact that one 
of the prominent four banks in South Africa - Nedbank, has currendy implemented the 
Moody's KMV model for credit risk estimation. 
The Moody's KMV model is valuable because it rendered the Merton (1974) model 
operational and turned it into a useful tool for practitioners. The model enables risk 
managers to monitor public companies on a day-to-day basis and use the estimated 
default probability as an early warning signal providing information that is entirely based 
on automated and purely quantitative analysis, and once in operation, the model is 
unlikely to fail due to human misinterpretation of the actual economic situation. 
However, being an extension of the Merton (1974) model, the Moody's KMV model 
inherits all its severe structural problems. Moreover, Moody's KMV has so far refused to 
publish the precise methodology and the data upon which the empirical distributions are 
calculated. 
This cannot be compensated by the fact that Moody's KMV asserts to have done 
detailed research that has proved all results. The lack of a publicly available test is critical 
because the exponential relationship between distance to default and estimated 
probability of default is so sensitive that small errors in the measuring of the distance to 
default or in the mapping between both quantities may lead to significant errors in the 
resulting default probability. 
45 Crosbie and Bohn (2003) 
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Conclusion 
Tills paper attempts to incorporate all the published methodologies as proposed by 
Moody's KMV in implementation of the Merton (1974) model, however certain 
methodologies will remain propriety to Moody's KMV. The implementation of the 
Merton (1974) mod 1 on the Johannesburg Stock exchange in South Africa has yielded 
some interesting results. Firsdy, South African firms are seen to be un-leveraged and 
tend to rely on equity financing as opposed to debt financing. NTC and SAP are the 
only two firms in the sample where relatively high degrees of leverage have been used in 
the capital structure. Further evidence of this notion can be seen in the probabilities of 
default being below 1 bps for all firms bar NTC and SAP in the sample. In addition, a 
relationship between the default probabilities as calculated by the Merton (197 4) model 
and firms rated in the lower part of the investment-grade category has been established, 
however, the Merton (197 4) model cannot adequately distinguish firms in terms of their 
probability of default within the higher part of the investment-grade category. 
Unfortunately due to the few firms that are currendy rated in the sample, further analysis 
of this kind could not be conducted. The overall result of this paper is that the Merton 
(1974) model when correcdy specified can provide information of the underlying credit 
risk of publicly traded firms in South Africa. 
' 
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Appendix A:. Data T abies 
Security JSE Rank Index 
Network Healthcare Ltd 34 Top40 
Sappi Ltd 35 Top40 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 14 Top40 
Imperial Holdings Ltd 30 Top40 
Barloworld Ltd 29 Top40 
Sasol Ltd 7 Top40 
Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd 32 Top40 
MTN Group Ltd 6 Top40 
Woolworths Holdings Ltd 39 Mid Cap 
Harmony G M Co Ltd 26 Top40 
African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 38 Mid Cap 
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 28 Top40 
Naspers Ltd 20 Top40 
Bidvest Ltd 24 Top40 
Nampak Ltd 52 Mid Cap 
Bhp Billiton Pic 2 Top40 
Shoprite Holdings Ltd 51 Mid Cap 
lllovo Sugar Ltd 74 Mid Cap 
Truworths International Ltd 42 Mid Cap 
JD Group Ltd 44 Mid Cap 
Gold Fields Ltd 15 Top40 
Murray And Roberts Ltd 40 Mid Cap 
Avi Ltd 83 Mid Cap 
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 11 Top40 
Mittal Steel SA Ltd 23 Top40 
Foschini Ltd 46 Mid Cap 
Sun International Ltd 47 Mid Cap 
Telkom SA Ltd 13 Top40 
Mr Price Group Ltd 73 Mid Cap 
Tiger Brands Ltd 31 Top40 
Lonmin Pic 17 Top40 
New Clicks Holdings Ltd 93 Mid Cap 
Massmart Holdings Ltd 43 Mid Cap 
Anglo American Pic 1 Top40 
Pretoria Port Cement Ltd 36 Top40 
Sabmiller Pic 3 Top40 
The Spar Group Ltd 71 Mid Cap 
Edgars Cons Stores Ltd 33 Top40 
Richemont Securities Ltd 5 Top40 
Pik N Pay Stores Ltd 45 Top40 
Anglo Platinum Ltd 4 Top40 
Remgro Ltd 16 Top40 
Average 
R Millions 
Ticker Mkt Cap (ZAR) Serviced Debt (ZAR) 
NTC 24,776.61 29,224.00 
SAP 24,504.88 18,167.00 
ANG 87,431 .39 3,720.00 
IPL 32,949.51 11 ,088.00 
BAW 35,097.81 13,000.00 
SOL 143,705.41 34,328.00 
SHF 28,286.26 8,838.10 
MTN 160,038.40 32,979.00 
WHL 17,969.51 4,253.80 
HAR 39,635.42 4,500.00 
ARI 19,663.98 2,252.00 
KIO 39,202.44 4,019.00 
NPN 55,302.40 4,444.00 
BVT 44,665.31 9,800.00 
NPK 14,389.05 4,971 .60 
BIL 353,562.12 70,124.00 
SHP 14,657.64 3,917.00 
ILV 6,929.57 1,960.00 
TRU 16,468.73 1,430.20 
JOG 15,904.35 2,113.00 
GFI 80,773.02 3,422.60 
MUR 17,357.98 2,074.10 
AVI 5,582.34 888.00 
IMP 110,221.51 3,590.30 
MLA 49,032.73 5,527.00 
FOS 15,259.61 1,779.40 
SUI 15,203.93 2,325.60 
TKG 88,553.55 16,754.00 
MPC 6,949.61 700.00 
TBS 28,789.76 3,977.10 
LON 62,354.68 6,075.00 
NCL 4,521 .29 500.00 
MSM 16,433.23 900.00 
AGL 530,791 .10 43,736.00 
PPC 22,595.34 1,065.60 
SAB 238,969.43 52,714.00 
SPP 7,705.75 716.00 
ECO 25,091 .05 1,168.00 
RCH 206,190.00 5,551 .00 
PIK 15,346.25 646.23 
AMS 215,594.67 835.60 
REM 78,531.41 2,221 .21 
71 ,833.07 10,054.65 
0/E Shares 






31 .25% 1 '140,575,014.00 
20.61% 1 ,850,154,903.00 
23.67% 883,022,422.00 
11 .35% 398,345,944.00 
11.45% 206,554,429.00 
10.25% 313,594,471.00 
8.04% 321 ,058,936.00 








11 .95% 331 ,892,619.00 
15.91% 315,386,460.00 
3.26% 553,876,920.00 
11 .27% 445,752,132.00 






11 .06% 353,226,015.00 
5.48% 199,190,697.00 
8.24% 1 ,517,413,104.00 




































































Merton (1974) Model Outputs 
Probability of Default (Bps) Std Deviation Asset Volatility Asset Drift 
Ticker JSE Rank Defualt Rank Base Worst Base Worst Base Worst Base Worst 
NTC 34 1 65.3141220286 202.9391945941 2.65 2.25 17.0% 20.2% 1.556% 0.778% 
SAP 35 2 38.2810273339 137.0560246012 2.91 2.49 24.6% 28.1% 3.1 12% 0.450% 
ANG 14 3 0.2748151766 8.1630729029 4.35 3.54 32.0% 39.2% 8.464% 5.279% 
IPL 30 4 0.17 48030430 9. 7636485862 4.43 3.48 29.5% 38.4% 7.240% 5.019% 
BAW 29 5 0.0870744702 0.1331957475 4.56 4.47 26.9% 27.3% 7.135% 4.562% 
SOL 7 6 0.0312686589 0.4838321481 4.85 4.28 33.5% 38.0% 10.123% 6.453% 
SHF 32 7 0.0131680034 0. 7863865459 4.96 4.10 28.0% 33.8% 8.696% 5.939% 
MTN 6 8 0.0027506730 0.1649722740 5.34 4.54 33.4% 39.0% 9.256% 7.066% 
WHL 39 9 0.0021388954 0.0962981071 5.36 4.63 30.3% 35.6% 8.339% 6.684% 
HAR 26 10 0.0018816367 0.0915411257 5.51 4.78 42.8% 49.3% 13.940% 8.617% 
ARI 38 11 0.0012399078 0.0076534113 5.69 5.52 40.4% 43.8% 12.090% 8.608% 
KIO 28 12 0.0007534043 0.0169206564 5.62 5.05 36.4% 40.3% 12.295% 7.910% 
NPN 20 13 0.0002658222 0.0659630746 5.77 4.76 33.0% 39.8% 10.126% 7.459% 
BVT 24 14 0.0002244741 0.1359622098 5.76 4.57 29.0% 37.1% 8.526% 6.763% 
NPK 52 15 0.0001703643 0.1415990752 5.74 4.48 22.4% 29.4% 6.820% 5.269% 
BIL 2 16 0.0000754204 0.0055929324 5.96 5.21 30.3% 34.2% 10.920% 7.148% 
SHP 51 17 0.0000314772 0.3314965994 6.06 4.35 25.2% 35.6% 7.144% 6.262% 
ILV 74 18 0.0000197142 0.0017327245 . 6.12 5.36 23.5% 26.7% 11 .750% 5.693% 
TRU 42 19 0.0000154004 0.0350558637. 6.33 5.02 40.6% 52.4% 10.158% 9.093% 
JOG 44 20 0.0000109306 0.0095971039 . 6.32 5.18 34.0% 42.2% 9.046% 8.286% 
GFI 15 21 . 0.0000059586 0.0275876123 6.58 5.19 50.3% 64.9% 13.991% 10.099% 
MUR 40 22 0.0000051475 0.0600656867 6.45 4.85 34.0% 47.0% 9.911% 8.509% 
AVI 83 23 0.0000033409 0.0003687-128 . 6.48 5.73 30.3% 34.4% 8.933% 7.785% 
IMP 11 24 ·0.0000020230 0.0003784676 6.78 5.98 52.7% 60.2% 16.150% 10.307% 
MLA 23 25 0.0000014655 0.0000762889 6.64 6.04 34.1% 37.7% 12.991% 8.652% 
FOS 46 26 0.0000009182 0.001529o487 6.71 5.53 33.7% 41 .3% 10.086% 8.564% 
SUI 47 27 0.0000008423 0.0000193092 6.63 6.15 24.1% 25.9% 8.959% 6.486% 
TKG 13 28 0.0000007587 0.0000833082 6.71 5.94 26.5% 30.1% 8.748% 7.196% .. 
MPC 73 29 0.0000005237 0.0000106647 6.81 6.36 34.9% 37.6% 10.871% 8.887% 
TBS 31 30 0.0000002947 0.0007966025 6.85 5.61 30.1% 37.2% 10.141% 8.135% 
LON 17 31 0.0000000402 0.0000409606 . 7.18 6.16 34.6% 40.0% 12.914% 8.901% 
NCL 93 32 0.0000000333 0.0000278718 . 7.18 6.20 31 .6% 36.9% 10.342% 8.697% 
MSM 43 33 0.0000000014 0.0000045576 • 7.69 6.59 38.9% 46.1% 10.864% 9.730% 
AGL 1 34 . 0.0000000005 : 0.0000345855 . 7.77 6.21 33.8% 42.0% 13.750% 9.230% 
PPC 36 35 0.0000000002 . 0.0000003569 . 7.85 6.88 31 .6% 36.5% 10.801% 9.140% 
SAB 3 36 0.0000000000 0.0000000652 8.04 7.01 20.8% 23.7% 11 .840% 6.792% 
SPP 71 37 '0.0000000000 0.0000006452 8.20 6.79 30.0% 36.3% 10.746% 9.047% 
ECO 33 38 0.0000000000 0.0000000635 . 8.69 7.21 36.3% 44.2% 11 .619% 9.855% 
RCH 5 39 0.0000000000 . 0.0000000215 .· 9.73 7.35 31 .7% 42.0% 13.094% 9.765% 
PIK 45 40 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 10.37 8.48 31 .0% 38.4% 11 .327% 9.991% 
AMS 4 41 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 . 11 .55 9.53 49.5% 60.1% 16.444% 10.721% 
REM 16 42 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 11 .82 9.27 30.6% 39.4% 12.080% 10.266% 















Beta Calculations as provided by Cadiz FSG 
Ticker Beta Annuallsed Alpha Std Error(p) 
NTC 0.46 -6.88 0.10 
SAP 0.95 3.70 0.11 
ANG 1.04 4.92 0.10 
IPL 0.63 -8.76 0.17 
BAW 0.77 -5.58 0.12 
SOL 1.12 17.13 0.21 
SHF 0.84 8.77 0.14 
MTN 0.70 6.45 0.18 
WHL 0.40 63.06 0.28 
HAR 1.44 7.23 0.18 
ARI 1.54 16.94 0.24 
KIO 1.31 14.08 0.10 
NPN 0.84 -0.58 0.17 
BVT 0.47 24.19 0.25 
NPK 0.36 37.46 0.30 
BIL 1.21 12.20 0.12 
SHP 0.20 4.25 0.30 
ILV 0.71 14.97 0.22 
TRU 0.25 6.46 0.12 
JOG 0.14 12.37 0.15 
GFI 1.09 16.69 0.11 
MUR 0.42 13.66 0.14 
AVI 0.28 57.12 0.22 
IMP 1.55 31 .60 0.14 
MLA 1.15 -6.45 0.15 
FOS 0.40 34.38 0.16 
SUI 0.72 -42.92 0.28 
TKG 0.04 28.21 0.13 
MPC 0.49 31 .30 0.18 
TBS 0.51 35.90 0.15 
LON 1.25 38.35 0.18 
NCL 0.41 24.72 0.22 
MSM 0.26 15.68 0.15 
AGL 1.38 46.12 0.15 
PPC 0.37 24.11 0.36 
SAB 0.74 24.96 0.16 
SPP 0.45 3.43 0.10 
ECO 0.45 9.90 0.31 
RCH 1.01 28.22 0.25 
PIK 0.31 36.78 0.19 
AMS 1.64 15.56 0.15 
REM 0.47 13.30 0.17 
,_- 0.73 16.98 0.18 
Annuallsed Total Risk Annuallsed Unique Risk R2 
33.49 15.88 77.520 
31 .24 17.28 69.410 
22.09 15.55 50.420 
45.39 27.56 63.130 
28.63 18.69 57.400 
37.55 34.38 16.160 
33.11 22.66 53.190 
44.58 28.82 58.220 
29.02 29.01 0.020 
37.34 29.56 37.320 
45.48 38.42 28.630 
18.32 15.45 28.890 
38.37 26.99 50.500 
44.91 40.90 17.050 
49.88 43.07 25.430 
21 .72 19.30 21 .020 
59.2 48.62 32.530 
41.64 31 .11 44.170 
25.05 18.79 43.720 
27.25 23.74 24.100 
21.2 18.26 25.860 
28.73 22.42 39.090 
37.52 36.31 6.360 
24.91 22.89 15.540 
32.22 24.74 41 .040 
27.08 25.88 8.640 
36.51 22.24 62.910 
22.02 20.33 14.790 
29.61 28.30 8.670 
25.4 24.88 4.040 
28.96 28.47 3.350 
35.66 35.59 0.430 
25.57 24.76 6.250 
25.08 23.66 10.980 
28.38 24.89 23.120 
26.24 25.96 2.160 
17.84 16.16 17.950 
51.49 50.14 5.200 
18.99 17.25 17.480 
32.55 30.87 10.060 
28.49 24.07 28.610 
28.42 27.84 4.050 
32.07 26.71 27.51 
---





































































Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd: 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 





































Appendix B: Individual Analysis of Finn Variables 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
Spread 3.35% 
interest Rate 12.97% 
Continuous 12.20% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 12.20% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 24.78 
Face value of Debt 29.22 
Payout Ratio 12.20% 
Interest Rate 12.20% 
Egu~ Volatii!!Y 36.42% 
Time 1.00 
I~ Drift ...... ~ 9.62% .. 
Equity Delta 0.89 
Equity Gamma 0.32 
Equity Theta -8.19 
Asset Drift -1.693% 
















GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
2006/09/21 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0853 
f3 0.8497 









AFS Date: 20 Sep 2006 
Rating: Ba 1 
SAP 
Base Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate ... ---
3.38% Spread 
13.00%' Interest Rate 
12.22% Continuous 
2.50% Dividend Yield 
2.47% Continuous DY 
14.69% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
24.50 Market value of Equity 
18.17 Face value of Debt 
14.69% Payout Ratio 
12.22% Interest Rate 
35.23% EgiJit)' Volatill~ 
1.00 Time 
12.47%1 I~ Drift ~ ,, ·-.,, !: ~-r~ j-·~:.. -~ 
0.95 
3.00% 
0.86 Equity Delta 
0.32 Equity Gamma 
-8.95 Equity Theta 











0.00% 'C Gl 
0.00% .!!! ftj 
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r::: 













GARCH {1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0570 
f3 0.8494 








Anglo gold Ashanti Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 





































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
Spread 4.70% 
Interest Rate 14.32% 
Continuous 13.38% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 13.38% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 87.43 
Face value of Debt 27.78 
Payout Ratio 13.38% 
Interest Rate 13.38% 
Eguitv Volatil~ 43.79% 
Time 1.00 
I Egu!ty Drift ,_ ' . ...- =--~ . - .. 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.07 
Equity Theta -54.87 
















GARCH (1,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





- - Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0984 
f3 0.8493 








Imperial Holdings Ltd 
AFS Date: 25 Jun 2006 
Rating: Baa 1 
IPL 
Base Case Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 2 YR Swap 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
- ----
Spread 2.70% Spread 
interest Rate 12.32% Interest Rate 
Continuous 11 .62% Continuous 
Dividend Yield 4.33% Dividend Yield 
Continuous DY 4.24% Continuous DY 
Asset Payout 15.86% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 32.95 Market value of Equity 
Face value of Debt 11 .09 Face value of Debt 
Payout Ratio 15.86% Payout Ratio 
Interest Rate 11.62% Interest Rate 
Egu!!Y, Volatll~ 32.74% Egu!!Y Volatili!Y 
Time 1.00 Time 
E,g!:fX Drift 'i'~~': ... P :.'->~. '. •.,. ·. ·11.51%1 lggt,!!!Y Drift . 
Beta 0.63 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.85 Equity Delta 
Equity Gamma 0.25 Equity Gamma 
Equity Theta -13.12 Equity Theta 
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GARCH (1,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
I Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a Q1~7 
p Q~~ 













1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 



































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
---.---
Spread 4.70% 
Interest Rate 14.32% 
Continuous 13.38% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 13.38% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 35.10 
Face value of Debt 13.00 
Payout Ratio 13.38% 
Interest Rate 13.38% 
Eauitv Volatilltv 31.66% 
Time 1.00 
IEaultv .. Orlft ~~' .\ .'>: .,,,, ~:,·. •,;\.·::' . •. ...; 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.26 
Equity Theta -13.71 















GARCH (1, 1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
ProbabilitY of default 
21/09/06 
1 Std Above 1 Std Below 










I Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
-- Std Dev Below 
a 0.0212 
f3 0.7710 









AFS Date: 30 Jun 2006 
Rating: Baa 1 
SOL 
Base Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
- -- -
2.70% Spread 
""12.32% Interest Rate 
11 .62% Continuous 
4.00% Dividend Yield 
3.92% Continuous DY 
15.54% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
143.71 Market value of Equity 
34.33 Face value of Debt 
15.54% Payout Ratio 
11.62% Interest Rate 
34.80% Eg~ Volatili1)! 
1.00 Time 
' > -~~;· ~ :t2.98%l ~~~Drift ·V ~ :' .· .. , ., 
1.12 
3.00% 
0.86 Equity Delta 
0.05 Equity Gamma 
-66.27 Equity Theta 




























GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0647 
fJ 0.8494 








Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd 




1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1 YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
Spread 2.03% 
krterest Rate 11.65%j 
Continuous 11 .02% 
Dividend Yield 2.50% 
Continuous DY 2.47% 
Asset Payout 13.49% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 28.29 
Face value of Debt 8.84 
Payout Ratio 13.49% 
Interest Rate 11.02% 
Egu~ Votatil~ 31.36% 
Time 1.00 
Egu~ Drift , ~;1' >~: ,.. ,·:·· ·12.14%1 
Beta 0.84 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.32 
Equity Theta -11.35 
Asset Drift 8.098% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% ----
Spread 4.03% 
Interest Rate 13.65% 
Continuous 12.80% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 12.80% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 28.29 
Face value of Debt 8.84 
Payout Ratio 12.80% 
Interest Rate 12.80% 
Egulty Volatility 37.88% 
Time 1.00 
~ Drift . • .. . . :;.· 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.88 
Equity Gamma 0.27 
Equity Theta -14.87 















GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability_ of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 






--Std Dev Above 
- - Std Dev Below 
a 0.0930 
f3 0.8496 








MTN Group Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 


































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1 YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% -Spread 3.35% 
Interest Rate 12.97% 
Continuous 12.20% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 12.20% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 160.04 
Face value of Debt 32 .98 
Payout Ratio 12.20% 
Interest Rate 12.20% 
Eg~ Volatili~ 40.83% 
Time 1.00 
IE~ Drift '' '-~·''"-"" ~ ••. ·. ·:Ff' ,. '-· . ' ·9 62% ...... ..,._ -- .... • :- . ~- ~ • # .-.~ . ••• • 
Equity Delta 0.89 
Equity Gamma 0.04 
Equity Theta -97.56 















GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
ProbabilitY of i::lefau lt 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0760 
f3 0.8494 








Woolworths Holdings Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 


































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
- ---
Spread 2.33% 
Interest Rate 11.95% 
Continuous 11 .29% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 11 .29% 
-------------
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 17.97 
Face value of Debt 4.25 
Payout Ratio 11.29% 
Interest Rate 11.29% 
Eguity Volatii!!Y 38.58% 
Time 1.00 
9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.89 
Equity Gamma 0.43 
Equity Theta -10.27 















GARCH (1,1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Proliability ofdefault 
2006109121 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1016 
f3 0.8496 








Harmony G M Co Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 


































1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 














































GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability ofdefault 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0316 
fJ 0.9608 








African Rainbow Minerals Ltd 




1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
--· -
Spread 5.00% 
Interest Rate 14.62% 
Continuous 13.65% 
Dividend Yield 5.00% 
Continuous DY 4.88% 
Asset Payout 18.52% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 19.66 
Face value of Debt 2.25 
Payout Ratio 18.52% 
Interest Rate 13.65% 




Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.83 
Equity Gamma 0.35 
Equity Theta -9.91 
Asset Drift 9.034% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% ---
Spread 6.00% 
Interest Rate 15.62% 
Continuous 14.51% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 14.51% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 19.66 
Face value of Debt 2.25 
Payout Ratio 14.51% 
Interest Rate 14.51% 
E~uity Volatility 41.65% 
Time 1.00 
IEgUitibrift .~ ~::.• /' :-:. ... , . .;. ·'-··,:9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.86 
Equity Gamma 0.34 
Equity Theta -12.24 

















GARCH (1,1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Pro~ability_Qf def;nllt 
21/09/06 
1 Std Above 1 Std Below 










I Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
- - Std Dev Below 
a 0.1320 
fJ 0.2665 








Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 

































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
·-
Spread 4.03% 
Interest Rate 13.65% 
Continuous 12.80% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 12.80% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 39.20 
Face value of Debt 6.00 
Payout Ratio 12.80% 
Interest Rate 12.80% 




Equity Delta 0.88 
Equity Gamma 0.18 
Equity Theta -23.67 
Asset Drift 7.910% 
GARCH (1,1) Model 
















c:: 10.00% < 
0.00% 
20/11/06 
AveVolatili 1 Std Above 1 Std Below 
34.47% 40.26% 31 .07% 
Base Case 
Rbn 
Value of Assets 44.58 
Asset Volatility 36.4% 
Market value of debt 5.38 





Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 






















1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 



































1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 









Market value of Equity 






















0.00% "C CD 
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GARCH {1 ,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Proba bility ofdefault 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





~~ Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0832 
f3 0.8495 













1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 

































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% --· -. .. 
Spread 4.70% 
Interest Rate --- 14.32%j 
Continuous 13.38% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 13.38% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 44.67 
Face value of Debt 9.80 
Payout Ratio 13.38% 
Interest Rate 13.38% 
E,gui~ Volatlli~ 38.70% 
Time 1.00 
lEg~ Drift ·lllllili :·'~- ;·,,';:·r~- 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.16 
Equity Theta -24.77 















GARCH (1,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Pro6atiility of default 
21/09/06 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0957 
f3 0.8713 













1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 









Marl<et value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
-
0.20% Spread 
9.82% Interest Rate 
9.37% Continuous 
5.30% Dividend Yield 
5.16% Continuous DY 
14.53% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
14.39 Marl<et value of Equity 
4.97 Face value of Debt 
14.53% Payout Ratio 
9.37% Interest Rate .. 
25.42% Eguitv VOiatilitv 
1.00 Time 
,· ·10.70%1 IEauitv Drtft ':".•~ .-.;~: · ;: '· ·· 
0.36 
3.00% 
0.86 Equity Delta 
0.76 Equity Gamma 
-4.00 Equity Theta 






































GARCH (1, 1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
I Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.5138 
f3 0.0000 








BHP Billiton PLC 




1 YR Swap 
2YR Swap 
1 YR forward Swap Rate 
9.78% 
9.70% 
9.62% -- --. 
Spread 2.03% 
Interest Rate 11.65% 
Continuous 11 .02% 
Dividend Yield 2.00% 
Continuous DY 1.98% 
Asset Payout 13.00% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 353.56 
Face value of Debt 70.12 
Payout Ratio 13.00% 
Interest Rate 11.02% 
Egu!f:y Volatll~ 31.32% 
Time 1.00 
11;9~ Drfft .. ~ ~· :~,-~;:"; '"'. ~·-.. - ' ·.-13.25%1 
Beta 1.21 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.88 
Equity Gamma 0.03 
Equity Theta -151 .52 
Asset Drift 10.920% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 













































GARCH (1,1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
ProbatiiiLty_ ofdefault 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0606 
f3 0.8496 








Shoprite H oldings Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 
1YR forward Swap Rate 
---· 
Spread 






Market value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
--
0.30% Spread 
9.92% Interest Rate 
9.46% Continuous 
2.00% Dividend Yield 
1.98% Continuous DY 
11 .44% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
14.66 Market value of Equity 
3.92 Face value of Debt 
11 .44% Payout Ratio 
9.46% Interest Rate 
27.92% Equity Volatlli!Y. 
1.00 Time 
;· _·10.22%1 I E<Mtv Drift · · ·)·.··· 
0.20 
3.00% 
0.89 Equity Delta 
0.72 Equity Gamma 
-5.41 Equity Theta 




































GARCH (1,1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
ProbabilitY of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a Q1319 
p QM~ 








Illovo Sugar Ltd 
AFS D ate: 31 Mar 2006 
Rating: N / R 
ILV 
Base Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 






























1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 












































GARCH (1, 1) Model 





Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
21/09/06 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1684 
fJ 0.3770 








Truworths International Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 













9.78%, 1 YR Swap 
9.70%i 2 YR Swap 
I 
9.62% 1 YR forward Swap Rate --
0.68%; Spread 
10.30%1 Interest Rate 
9.80% Continuous 
3.50% Dividend Yield 
3.44% Continuous DY 
13.24% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
16.47 Market value of Equity 
1.43 Face value of Debt 
13.24% Payout Ratio 
9.80% Interest Rate 
38.38% E~~ Volatility 
1.00 Time 
10.37%1 ~~~Drift :;-:-<,-.:._,,_. .... · 
0.25 
3.00% 
0.88 Equity Delta 
0.45 Equity Gamma 
-9.56 Equity Theta 
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GARCH (1,1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probabilitv of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
- - Std Dev Below 
a 0.1209 
f3 0.8491 








JD Group Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 






Interest Rate 10.02% 
Continuous 9.55% 
. 
Dividend Yield 3.69% 
Continuous DY 3.62% 
Asset Payout 13.17% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 15.90 
Face value of Debt 2.11 
Payout Ratio 13.17% 
Interest Rate 9.55% 
33.39% 
1.00 
Egu!tY Drift· · :. '·· ···~;; ·:-- ..... ,j;· -. '-- '1004%1 •• ~ • '<-.:J •<t • 
Beta 0.14 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.88 
Equity Gamma 0.54 
Equity Theta -7.63 
Asset Drift 9.046% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 






Market value of Equity 




















11 .35%1 ~ 
iii c 
0.00% "C CD 
0.00% !P. iii 
:::J 
c:: 













GARCH (1,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1482 
f3 0.7772 








Gold Fields Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 











9.78%1 1 YR Swap 
9.70%1 2 YR Swap 
9.62%! 1YR forward Swap Rate 
3.38% Spread 
13.00%1 Interest Rate 
12.22% Continuous 
3.33% Dividend Yield 
3.28% Continuous DY 
15.50% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
80.77 Market value of Equity 
3.42 Face value of Debt 
15.50% Payout Ratio 
12.22% Interest Rate 
44.66% !;Q!!.iW_ Vol!ltllltv 
1.00 Time 
12~1 IEalitv Drift ' · · '~ ·;· 
1.09 
3.00% 
0.86 Equity Delta 
0.08 Equity Gamma 
-55.60 Equity Theta 
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GARCH (1,1) Model 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
21/09/06 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
-- Std Dev Below 
a 0.1287 
f3 0.8484 








Murray And Roberts Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
... - --- . 
3.38% Spread 
13.00% Interest Rate 
~ 
12.22% Continuous 
1.15% Dividend Yield 
1.14% Continuous DY 
13.37% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
17.36 Market value of Equity 
2.07 Face value of Debt 
13.37% Payout Ratio 
12.22% Interest Rate 
33.75% E~\!IY. Volatlli!): 
1.00 Time 
' 10.88%1 ~~~Drift -;, :,.~ -. -. 
0.42 
3.00% 
0.87 Equity Delta 
0.49 Equity Gamma 
-8.43 Equity Theta 
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GARCH {1,1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probabilityo f default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.4743 
f3 0.0000 













1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 















9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate - - --
2.70% Spread 
12.32'!(. Interest Rate 
11 .62% Continuous 
3.00% Dividend Yield 
2.96% Continuous DY 
14.57% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
5.58 Market value of Equity 
0.89 Face value of Debt 
14.57% Payout Ratio 
11.62% Interest Rate 
29.90% Eguj!y Volatiii!Y 
1.00 Time 
_,._ .· ··10146~ ,. : •:::2; ) ~. • ' IEg~Drtft '(:..' ·.; . ·, 
0.28 
3.00% 
0.86 Equity Delta 
1.67 Equity Gamma 
-2.21 Equity Theta 
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0.00% .!!! iii 
:I 
c:: 














GARCH (1,1) Model 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability_ of ch~fault 
21/09/06 
1 Std Above 1 Std Below 
34.36% 25.44% 
Rbn 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0753 
f3 0.8497 









Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 




1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1 YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
--- -
Spread 3.25% 
Interest Rate 12.87% 
Continuous 12.11% 
Dividend Yield 5.75% 
Continuous DY 5.59% 
Asset Payout 17.70% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 110.22 
Face value of Debt 3.59 
Payout Ratio 17.70% 
Interest Rate 12.11% 
Equity VolatilitY 45.47% 
Time 1.00 I 
IEQ!!!!xDrifl·'·.·~""··-~-. . . J. . ·' ' $ .... 5 . ,.,~ .. .. ·14.27%1 
Beta 1.55 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.84 
Equity Gamma 0.05 
Equity Theta -76.01 
Asset Drift 16.150% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
Spread 5.25% 
IntereSt' Rate 14.87%i 
Continuous 13.86% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 13.86% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 110.22 
Face value of Debt 3.59 
Payout Ratio 13.86% 
Interest Rate '13.86% 
Egu~ Volatili~ 53.87~ 
Time 1.00 
IEqultv Drift · ~·~ . '·. ';c - .' ;._.,>;,~;-.:~9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.05 
Equity Theta -96.32 















GARCH (1,1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 






--Std Dev Above 
- - Std Dev Below 
a 0.0825 
f3 0.8538 








Mittal Steel SA Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








- ------- - - ---- --
Market value of Equity 












9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2YRSwap 
9.62% 1 YR forward Swap Rate ·---.. -------
5.41% Spread 
15.03% Interest Rate 
14.00% Continuous 
6.00% Dividend Yield 
5.83% Continuous DY 
19.83% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
49.03 Market value of Equity 
5.53 Face value of Debt 
19.83% Payout Ratio 
14.00% Interest Rate 




0.82 Equity Delta 
0.17 Equity Gamma 
-18.58 Equity Theta 
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GARCH (1,1) Model 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of d~ult 
21/09/06 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0814 
f3 0.8496 









AFS Date: 31 Mar 2006 
Rating: N / R 
FOS 
Base Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 









Market value of Equity 


































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
·- -- - --
Spread 4.70% 
Interest Rate 14.32% 
Continuous 13.38% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 13.38% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 15.26 
Face value of Debt 1.78 
Payout Ratio 13.38%1 
Interest Rate 13.38%1 
Eg~ Volatlli!}' 39.78%! 
Time 1.00 
9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.47 
Equity Theta -9.11 
















GARCH {1,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Pro bability_ of d efault 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1085 
f3 0.8496 








Sun International Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 












9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate -- --·-
2.70% Spread 
12.32% interesrRate -
11 .62% Continuous 
3.50% Dividend Yield 
3.44% Continuous DY 
15.06% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
15.20 Market value of Equity 










11.78%1 lEg~ Drift • " 
0.72 
3.00% 
0.86 Equity Delta 
0.72 Equity Gamma 
-4.35 Equity Theta 









13.38% ~ -; 
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GARCH (1,1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
ProliStiiJiti of default 
21/09/06 











I Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0985 
f3 0.2955 






Probability_ of default ----0.000000193% 
Page 109 
T elkom SA Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 


































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
Spread 6.06% 
Interest Rate 151i% 
Continuous 14.57% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 14.57% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 88.55 
Face value of Debt 16.75 
Payout Ratio 14.57% 
Interest Rate 14.57% 




Equity Delta 0.86 
Equity Gamma 0.10 
Equity Theta -34.74 














GARCH (1, 1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0730 
f3 0.8498 








Mr Price Group Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 


































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
-· -
Spread 6.00% 
Interest Rate 1'5.62% 
Continuous 14.51% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 





Market value of Equity 6.95 
Face value of Debt 0.70 
Payout Ratio 14.51% 
Interest Rate 14.51% 
Equity Volatility 35.39% 
Time 1.00 
9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.86 
Equity Gamma 1.13 
Equity Theta -3.53 















GARCH (1,1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











I Value of Assets 
Asset Volat1hty 
I Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0476 
fJ 0.8496 








Tiger Brands Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 





































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% ---Spread 6.73% 
Interest Rate 16.35% 
Continuous 15.14% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 15.14% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 28.79 
Face value of Debt 3.98 
Payout Ratio 15.14% 
Interest Rate 15.14% 
Eg~ Volatll~ 35.82% 
Time 1.00 
1 Eaut•iDrHt ... ,.,_,. • o<;o~ ···.: •:. · ··- ., ... ~' ,·· 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.86 
Equity Gamma 0.27 
Equity Theta -14.47 
















GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21109/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0999 
fJ 0.8497 













1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 





















Eg~Drift · ·- .... ·_::, .·til.,": ,, ;. /:;;;; !13.37%1 
Beta 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.89 
Equity Gamma 0.14 
Equity Theta -31 .25 
Asset Drift 12.914% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% --
Spread 2.68% 
Interest Rate 12.30% 
Continuous 11 .60% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 11 .60% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 62.35 
Face value of Debt 6.08 
Payout Ratio 11.60% 
Interest Rate 11.60% 
Egu~ Volatllil.)' 38.69% 
Time 1.00 
IEa~Drift · - ... ''· -<~: . . "'· .. :•: ... ' .. 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.89 
Equity Gamma 0.12 
Equity Theta -37.25 

















GARCH {1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability_ of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
- - Std Dev Below 
a 0.0678 
f3 0.8495 








N ew Clicks Holdings Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 









Market value of Equity 











9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
--- -~ 
5.41% Spread 
15.03% Interest Rate 
14.00% Continuous 
3.70% Dividend Yield 
3.63% Continuous DY 
17.64% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
4.52. Market value of Equity 
0.50. Face value of Debt 
17.64% Payout Ratio 
14.00% Interest Rate 




0.84 Equity Delta 
1.99 Equity Gamma 
-1 .65 Equity Theta 





































GARCH (1,1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Proba bilitv of default 
21/09/06 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1308 
f3 0.7147 








M assmart Holdings Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 




































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
-----
Spread 3.38% 
Interest Rate 13.00% 
Continuous 12.22% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 12.22% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 16.43 
Face value of Debt 0.90 
Payout Ratio 12.22% 
Interest Rate 12.22% .. 
~~Volatlli~ 42.75% 
Time 1.00 
IEauitY Drift -·· -·-- -'~ '.-.i•,,.-; ._: ·:"""':~*"'~' o··: ·9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.88 
Equity Gamma 0.41 
Equity Theta -11 .10 
















GARCH {1,1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
21/09/06 










Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
I Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0806 
f3 0.8494 








Anglo American PLC 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 




































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% - •. -
Spread 4.70% 
lnterestRate · 14.32% 
Continuous 13.38% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 13.38% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 530.79 
Face value of Debt 43.74 
Payout Ratio 13.38% 
Interest Rate 13.38% 
Eg~Volatll~ 39.43% 
Time 1.00 
IEaiAtv Dl1ft '7•;t.::i ~1. ·:,·-~· -~- · ·..: · •. 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.01 
Equity Theta -317.53 

















GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Protiatiilitv of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1082 
fJ 0.8363 








Pretoria Port Cement Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1YR forward Swap Rate 
4.06% Spread 
13.68% Interest Rate 
12.82% Continuous 
5.23%! Dividend Yield 
5.10%i Continuous DY 
17.92%i Asset Payout 
Rbn 
22.60 Market value of Equity 








",10:73%1 l,5gu!ty Drift . .. . . ';:t-:.\··· ....... · .... ;· '. ·· ..... - .-· 
0.37 
3.00% 
0.84 Equity Delta 
0.40 Equity Gamma 
-8.08 Equity Theta 




































GARCH (1,1) Model 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0908 
fJ 0.8497 













1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 




































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70%; 




Interest Rate 13.65% 
Continuous 12.80% 
Dividend Yield 0.00%1 
Continuous DY 0.00%! 
Asset Payout 12.80% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 238.97 
Face value of Debt 52.71 
Payout Ratio 12.80% 
Interest Rate 12.80% 
Eg\l!tY Volatlli~ 24.85% 
Time 1.00 
I EaYIW Drift - . " · .. '_· ~ . -9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.88 
Equity Gamma 0.05 
Equity Theta -72.39 
















GARCH (1,1) Model 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
1 Probabiifty of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0399 
fJ 0.9375 








The Spar Group Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 





































1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% 
- - .. 
Spread 6.00% 
Interest Rate 15.62% 
Continuous 14.51% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 14.51% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 7.71 
Face value of Debt 0.72 
Payout Ratio 14.51%! 
Interest Rate ,.14.51%! 
EgY!_tY. Volatili~ 33.94%! 
Time 1.00 
IEaultvDrlft ···~,., · :: · .. ;n-;:.::·< ~..:._"\:.~-:.i!9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.86 
Equity Gamma 1.06 
Equity Theta -3.72 















GARCH (1,1) Model 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of default 
21/09/06 
1 Std Above 1 Std Below 










Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1437 
fJ 0.7922 








Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 




1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% -- -
Spread 0.68% 
Interest Rate 10.30% 
Continuous 9.80% 
Dividend Yield 4.00% 
Continuous DY 3.92% 
Asset Payout 13.73% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 25.09 
Face value of Debt 1.17 
Payout Ratio 13.73% 
Interest Rate 9.80% 




Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.87 
Equity Gamma 0.34 
Equity Theta -1 2.16 
Asset Drift 11 .619% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 9.78% 
2 YR Swap 9.70% 
1YR forward Swap Rate 9.62% ---
Spread 2.68% 
Interest Rate 12.30~ 
Continuous 11 .60% 
Dividend Yield 0.00% 
Continuous DY 0.00% 
Asset Payout 11 .60% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 25.09 
Face value of Debt 1.17 
Payout Ratio 11.60% 
Interest Rate 11.60% 
Egu~ Volatili!Y. 40.99% 
Time 1.00 
I ~;<I~ Drift ~ - ... J."::).•-::_ - - '_, , ..... ,- ..... 'i 9.62% 
Equity Delta 0.89 
Equity Gamma 0.29 
Equity Theta -16.30 

















GARCH (1, 1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
1Pr0b'ability of defa'Uit 
21/09/06 










I Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
I Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.0815 
fJ 0.8495 








Richemont Securities Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Marl<et value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1 YR forward Swap Rate 
0.68% Spread 
10.30% Interest Rate 
9.80% Continuous 
1.86% Dividend Yield 
1.84% Continuous DY 
11 .65% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
206.19 Marl<et value of Equity 
10.55 Face value of Debt 
11.65% Payout Ratio 
9.80% Interest Rate 
29.50% Eaultv Volatilltv 
1.00 Time 
· 12.65%1 IEaultv Drift".-~~ ~n-. · -- · · 
1.01 
3.00% 
0.89 Equity Delta 
0.05 Equity Gamma 
-89.84 Equity Theta 






























GARCH (1,1) Model 















Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability ofdefault 
21/09/06 













Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1069 
fJ 0.8497 







Pik N Pay Stores Ltd 
AFS D ate: 28 Feb 2006 
Rating: N / R 
PIK 
Base Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 





Inte rest Rate 11.12%' 
Continuous 10.54% 
Dividend Yield 4.23% 
Continuous DY 4.14% 
Asset Payout 14.69% 
Rbn 
Market value of Equity 15.35 
Face value of Debt 0.65 
Payout Ratio 14.69% 
Interest Rate 10.54% 
E!!Uit)t Volatil!_ty 27.83% 
Time 1.00 
§gu!ty Drift ... - . -=:c-.:-:- -- . "--··-·~ -10 55%1 . . ~ · .... ~ . . 
Beta 0.31 
Risk Premium 3.00% 
Equity Delta 0.86 
Equity Gamma 0.65 
Equity Theta -5.86 
Asset Drift 11 .327% 
Worst Case 
1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 















































GARCH (1 ,1) Model 












Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Probability of defau lt 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1143 
f3 0.8498 








Anglo Platinum Ltd 




1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 








Market value of Equity 













9.78% 1 YR Swap 
9.70% 2 YR Swap 
9.62% 1 YR forward Swap Rate 
-
0.68% Spread 
10.30% Interest Rate 
9.80% Continuous 
3.14% Dividend Yield 
3.09% Continuous DY 
12.90% Asset Payout 
Rbn 
215.59 Market value of Equity 
0.84 Face value of Debt 
12.90% Payout Ratio 
9.80% Interest Rate 
43.66% 5g~Volatll~ 
1.00 Time 
14.54%1 lEg~ Drift ·~ • ~·. ~·;-·, · .·-
1.64 
3.00% 
0.88 Equity Delta 
0.03 Equity Gamma 
-1 50.46 Equity Theta 




































GARCH (1, 1) Model 






Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
Proba6ilitY of default 
21/09/06 











Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 





--Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a Q14~ 
p Q7622 













1 YR Swap 





Market value of Equity 































1 YR Swap 
2 YR Swap 







Market value of Equity 















































GARCH (1, 1) Model 














Value of Assets 
Asset Volatility 
Market value of debt 
21/09/06 











-- Std Dev Above 
--Std Dev Below 
a 0.1101 
f3 0.8498 




Value of Assets 80.50 
Asset Volatility 39.4% 
I Market value of debt 1.97 
Probabiiiti"Of default - 0.00000000% 
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